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Meta-Evidence and Preliminary
Injunctions
Maggie Wittlin
The decision to issue a preliminary injunction is enormously consequential; it has been
likened to “judgment and execution before trial.” Yet, courts regularly say that our primary
tool for promoting truth seeking at trial—the Federal Rules of Evidence—does not apply at
preliminary injunction hearings. Judges frequently consider inadmissible evidence to make
what may be the most important ruling in the case. This Article critically examines this
widespread evidentiary practice.
In critiquing courts’ justifications for abandoning the Rules in the preliminary
injunction context, this Article introduces a new concept: “meta-evidence.” Meta-evidence is
evidence of what evidence will be presented at trial. I demonstrate that much evidence
introduced at the preliminary injunction stage is, in fact, meta-evidence. And I show why
meta-evidence that initially appears inadmissible under the Rules is often, in fact, admissible.
Applying the Rules at the preliminary injunction stage, then, would not exclude nearly as
much evidence as courts may have assumed.
I offer two proposals for how courts should use the Rules at the preliminary injunction
phase. More ambitiously, I suggest courts should apply the Rules with an exception directly
tailored to the dangers of limiting admissible evidence when the parties are under time pressure.
Alternatively, I suggest that courts simply recognize when evidence is actually meta-evidence
and weigh it appropriately. Courts should acknowledge that meta-evidence is probative only
to the extent it tends to show the proponent will produce admissible evidence at trial.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 28, 2017—before he was President Trump’s lawyer—former New
York City Mayor and presidential adviser Rudy Giuliani appeared on Fox News.1
Host Jeanine Pirro had invited him on to discuss President Trump’s “travel ban,”
which temporarily suspended immigration from seven countries.2 When Pirro asked
Giuliani how Trump chose the specific countries for the ban, Giuliani replied, “I’ll
tell you the whole history of it. So, when [the President] first announced it, he said
‘Muslim ban.’ He called me up. He said, ‘Put a commission together. Show me the
right way to do it legally.’”3

1. Justice with Judge Jeanine: Giuliani: Immigration Ban Is Based on Danger, not Religion (Fox
News television broadcast Jan. 29, 2017), http://video.foxnews.com/v/5301869519001/ [https://
perma.cc/T8BK-KXWG#sp=show-clips].
2. See Exec. Order No. 13,769 § 3(c), 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017) (suspending entry of
persons “from countries referred to in section 217(a)(12) of the [Immigration and Nationality Act]”).
3. Justice with Judge Jeanine: Giuliani: Immigration Ban Is Based on Danger, not Religion, supra
note 1.
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States and human rights organizations began filing lawsuits seeking to enjoin
the travel ban as soon as it was announced. Not two months after the Giuliani
interview, a federal judge in Maryland granted a preliminary injunction,4 temporarily
halting a similar second travel ban.5 The judge found the plaintiffs could
demonstrate that the primary purpose of the ban was likely to exclude Muslims, not
to advance national security interests.6 In its analysis, the court cited Giuliani’s
statements from the Fox News interview, noting, “Mayor Giuliani’s account of his
conversations with President Trump reveal that the plan had been . . . to
approximate a Muslim ban without calling it one . . . .”7 When the Supreme Court
reversed a preliminary injunction of the ban, it, too, cited the interview as evidence.8
But aren’t Giuliani’s remarks hearsay?9 They are statements made out of court
offered to show the truth of what’s asserted in the statements—namely, that
President Trump in fact told Giuliani that he wanted a Muslim ban.10 This is not
even particularly reliable hearsay.11 Giuliani spoke spontaneously during a
performative television interview, not solemnly under oath. The meaning of his
comments was not entirely clear, and he might have misunderstood the President.
These are precisely the sorts of ambiguities that cross-examination is designed to
resolve. In other words, isn’t Giuliani’s comment exactly the kind of out-of-court
statement that factfinders should be prohibited from relying on?12 Yet the district
court and, later, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit13 relied on the
statement with little fanfare.
This is hardly surprising. Just one year earlier, the Fourth Circuit, like many
circuits before it, held that courts may rely on hearsay or other inadmissible evidence

4. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65.
5. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 565–66 (D. Md. 2017)
(enjoining Exec. Order No. 13,780 § 2(c), 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017)).
6. Id. at 563 (“Thus, it is more likely that the primary purpose of the travel ban was grounded
in religion, and even if the Second Executive Order has a national security purpose, it is likely that its
primary purpose remains the effectuation of the proposed Muslim ban.”).
7. Id. at 559. Other district courts also cited the interview in preliminary injunction rulings.
See id.
8. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417 (2018); see also id. at 2436 (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting).
9. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
10. Trump’s statements themselves are not hearsay within hearsay, as they are statements of an
opposing party, admissible under section 801(d)(2)(A) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
11. See Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 958 (1974) (noting the
“four testimonial infirmities of ambiguity, insincerity, faulty perception, and erroneous memory”).
12. A proponent of the evidence could argue that Giuliani was an authorized “speaking agent”
for the president. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C). But that is not apparent from the video or from how
the opinions discussed the comment. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 241 F. Supp. 3d at
558–59, aff’d and vacated in part, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (using the Giuliani comment as evidence of
Trump’s intent), vacated, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2417 (referring to Giuliani as a “campaign
adviser[ ]”). President Trump had recently named Giuliani “an informal adviser on cybersecurity.” Abby
Phillip, Trump Names Rudy Giuliani as Cybersecurity Adviser, WASH. POST, ( Jan. 12, 2017), https://
wapo.st/2ymb19E [ https://perma.cc/QF72-Q824 ].
13. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 594 (en banc), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017).
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when making preliminary injunction decisions.14 In that standard-setting case,
Gavin Grimm (G.G.),15 a transgender teenager in Virginia, had moved for a
preliminary injunction ordering his school to let him use the boys’ restroom. The
district court denied the motion, in part because Grimm had relied on “mostly
inadmissible hearsay”16—principally, his own declaration that a psychologist had
diagnosed him with gender dysphoria, rather than a declaration from the
psychologist herself.17
The Fourth Circuit vacated the decision, concluding that “the district court
used the wrong evidentiary standard in assessing G.G.’s motion for a preliminary
injunction.”18 The court stated that preliminary injunctions “are governed by less
strict rules of evidence,” and “it was error for the district court to summarily reject
G.G.’s proffered evidence because it may have been inadmissible at a subsequent
trial.”19 The court joined seven other circuits in concluding that for purposes of a
preliminary injunction motion, hearsay is admissible; “the nature of evidence as
hearsay goes to ‘weight, not preclusion.’”20
While these were newsworthy preliminary injunction motions with culturally
salient facts, as far as the evidentiary issues go, they were quite typical. Parties
sometimes do not bother challenging the introduction of inadmissible evidence on
motions for a preliminary injunction.21 When they do, courts often deny their
motions, saying that admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) goes
to weight, not preclusion. If the other party does not challenge the applicability of
the FRE, the judge may simply entertain the objection and decide whether to admit
or exclude the evidence.22 This loose practice has gone largely unquestioned both
in the courts and in the academic literature. That is troubling. Given the importance

14. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 726 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated on
other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
15. Documents in the case refer to Grimm, then a minor, as “G.G.” Because he has discussed
the case with the press openly, I refer to him by his name here. See, e.g., Moriah Balingit, Gavin Grimm
Just Wanted to Use the Bathroom. He Didn’t Think the Nation Would Debate It., WASH. POST (Aug. 30,
2016), http://wapo.st/2bA7XL0 [https://perma.cc/KN29-LML9].
16. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 751, 753
(E.D. Va. 2015), rev’d and vacated in part, 822 F.3d 709.
17. He did, however, submit a declaration from a different clinical psychologist who had
examined Grimm for purposes of the lawsuit. See id. at 749. The district court gave little weight to that
declaration and generally evinced skepticism of Grimm’s claims of harm and solicitude toward the
school board’s claims. Id. I return to the second declaration later.
18. Grimm, 822 F.3d at 715.
19. Id. at 725.
20. Id. (quoting Mullins v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 2010)).
21. For example, Gloucester County did not challenge Grimm’s evidence.
See Brief in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Grimm, 132 F. Supp. 3d 736
(No. 4:15-cv-00054-RGD-TEM), ECF No. 30.
22. See Interview with a United States Magistrate Judge within the Second Circuit ( July 18, 2017)
[hereinafter Magistrate Judge Interview]; Interview with a United States District Judge within the Tenth
Circuit (Oct. 25, 2017) [hereinafter Tenth Circuit District Judge 1 Interview].
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of preliminary injunction proceedings—they’re often functionally dispositive23—the
applicable evidentiary standard can have a large influence on a case.
This Article critically examines the existing evidentiary practice on preliminary
injunction motions. It uses textual, historical, and policy analysis to pinpoint
problems with courts’ justifications for declining to apply the FRE. Ultimately, it
concludes that the current practice is suboptimal.
In critiquing the justifications for disregarding the FRE at preliminary
injunction hearings, this Article introduces a new and useful concept: “meta-evidence.”
I define meta-evidence as evidence of what evidence will be produced at trial. To
obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show that they are “likely to succeed
on the merits.”24 Evidence offered in support of this key element is meta-evidence;
it is evidence of what admissible evidence that party will present at trial.
Here’s why that matters: A central policy concern with applying the FRE at
the preliminary injunction stage is that the rules will exclude too much evidence and
either stop courts from preventing irreparable harm or induce them to inflict it. But
simply eliminating the FRE in this context uses a blunt instrument for a nuanced
problem. Instead, by focusing on what the evidence is being offered to prove at this stage,
we can see that much evidence that initially appears inadmissible under the FRE
would actually be admissible. Specifically, the rule against hearsay prohibits parties
from introducing out-of-court statements for the truth of the matter asserted.25 But
a meta-evidentiary statement is offered not for its truth, but rather to prove that the
declarant could testify to the substance of the statement at a future trial.26 The
statement, then, is non-hearsay. Under this understanding, a large portion of the
supposedly “inadmissible” evidence at the preliminary injunction stage is, in fact,
admissible meta-evidence.
An understanding of meta-evidence also allows judges to come to more
accurate determinations of the likelihood of success on the merits. Courts should
give greater weight to meta-evidence that clearly indicates that the offering party
will be able to produce admissible evidence at trial and less weight to meta-evidence
that does not clearly point to forthcoming admissible evidence. The Article also
discusses how “meta-evidence” can yield insight into motions for summary
judgment and motions to dismiss.
Part I of this Article introduces preliminary injunctions and discusses the
current practice of courts with respect to preliminary injunction evidence and the
23. See infra Section II.C.1.
24. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
25. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
26. James Duane has made a similar move in the summary judgment context—arguing
affidavits used at summary judgment are non-hearsay because they are offered only to show what’s to
come at trial. James Joseph Duane, The Four Greatest Myths About Summary Judgment, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1523, 1531–44 (1995). Duane’s insight serves to clear up confused descriptions
of summary judgment in treatises and advisory committee notes. He does not suggest the argument has
any doctrinal implications, as Rule 56 explicitly permits affidavits on summary judgment. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). In the preliminary injunction context, the insight has real payoff.
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FRE. Part II examines whether disregarding the FRE is justified by looking at text,
history, and policy. Part II introduces the concept of meta-evidence and uses that
concept to explain why applying the FRE at the preliminary injunction stage will
not exclude as much evidence as courts have suggested. Part III sets out the benefits
and drawbacks of applying the FRE to preliminary injunctions.
Finally, Part IV makes two proposals for improving consideration of evidence
at the preliminary injunction stage. The first proposal is more ambitious and more
tentative: Courts should apply the FRE but add an escape hatch, akin to the residual
hearsay exception. If (1) time constraints prevent a party from obtaining admissible
evidence, and the party offers otherwise-inadmissible evidence that (2) is sufficiently
trustworthy and (3) will not unduly prejudice the other party, a court should
consider that evidence at the preliminary injunction stage. Applying the FRE with
the addition of this escape hatch would enhance both predictability and accuracy.27
The second proposal is more modest: even if courts continue to ignore the FRE,
they should use the meta-evidence idea to determine the weight of evidence at the
preliminary injunction stage.
Under both proposals, the Giuliani statement would come in. But under both
proposals, courts should give it less weight than they might be tempted to give it.
The statement is not admissible under the FRE to prove that President Trump
actually made the alleged remarks. But it is admissible to prove that this declarant,
Rudy Giuliani, could come and testify at a future trial. To the extent the statement
tends to prove that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed at trial—and only to that
extent—it is admissible and probative meta-evidence.28
I. THE LAW AS IT STANDS
A. Preliminary Injunctions: A Brief Introduction
When a plaintiff fears that a defendant will cause irreparable harm in the time
between the commencement of a lawsuit and trial, that plaintiff may seek a
preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction grants temporary injunctive relief
to the movant and usually remains in effect until the court issues a final judgment
on the merits.29 Plaintiffs seek, and courts grant, preliminary injunctions in a wide
variety of cases. These range from private disputes—such as when an employer
seeks to enjoin a former employee from disclosing trade secrets30 or violating a
27. This approach would satisfy the central purpose of the preliminary injunction standard, “to
minimize the probable irreparable loss of rights caused by errors incident to hasty decision.” John
Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 540–41 (1978).
28. Under the second proposal, it would be admissible to prove that President Trump actually
made the remarks, but only to the extent that it tends to prove there will be evidence of animus at trial.
29. See 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2947
(3d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2018).
30. See, e.g., Cerro Fabricated Prods. L.L.C. v. Solanick, 300 F. Supp. 3d 632 (M.D. Pa. 2018);
Pyro Spectaculars N., Inc. v. Souza, 861 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (E.D. Cal. 2012); Uncle B’s Bakery,
Inc. v. O’Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
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covenant not to compete,31 or when one company seeks to enjoin another from
infringing its patent,32 copyright,33 or trademark34—to cases with major public
impact, such as environmental litigation,35 challenges to federal immigration
policy,36 and litigation seeking to enjoin state restrictions on abortion.37
The preliminary injunction phase is often high stakes for both the movant and
the defendant. The movant alleges that it will be irreparably harmed absent a timely
injunction—an injunction at the end of the case will not suffice to prevent injury;
compensation will not make the movant whole. The defendant is at risk of being
subject to an invasive court order prior to a full trial on the merits, and the
defendant, too, may face the prospect of irreparable harm caused by the
preliminary relief.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 65 allows a party to seek a preliminary
injunction on notice to the other party.38 The Rule is modeled on Equity Rule 73
and codifies a remedy that extends back to at least eighteenth-century English
Chancery.39 Rule 65 is sparse; it does not set out a substantive standard for granting
preliminary injunctions, and it does not specify what sort of hearing a preliminary
injunction motion requires. Courts have stepped in on both fronts.40
Courts emphasize that the “preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy
never awarded as of right.”41 But they have also long considered four factors in
determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction: “[1] the plaintiff’s likelihood
of success on the merits, [2] the prospect of irreparable harm, [3] the comparative
31. See, e.g., Maaco Franchising, Inc. v. Augustin, No. 09-4548, 2010 WL 1644278
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2010); Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Youngblade, 878 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
32. See, e.g., Everett Labs., Inc. v. Breckenridge Pharm., Inc., 573 F. Supp. 2d 855 (D.N.J. 2008);
P.N.A. Constr. Techs., Inc. v. McTech Grp., Inc., 414 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
33. See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167 (7th Cir. 1997); Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
34. See, e.g., Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700 (3d Cir. 2004); Bebe Stores,
Inc. v. May Dep’t Stores Int’l, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 980 (E.D. Mo. 2002).
35. See, e.g., All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011); Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc. v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
36. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 594 (4th Cir. 2017) (en
banc) (affirming preliminary injunction of President Trump’s “travel ban”); Texas v. United States, 809
F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming preliminary injunction of President Obama’s deferred action
programs), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
37. See, e.g., Edwards v. Beck, 946 F. Supp. 2d 843 (E.D. Ark. 2013); Carhart v. Stenberg, 972
F. Supp. 507 (D. Neb. 1998).
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a). Rule 65 also provides for temporary restraining orders, which may be
issued without notice to the other party and can remain in place for no more than 14 days. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b).
39. See Daniel C. Hopkinson, The New Federal Rules of Procedure as Compared with the Former
Federal Equity Rules and the Wisconsin Code, 23 MARQ. L. REV. 159, 184 (1939); Leubsdorf, supra note
27, at 528.
40. As Leubsdorf notes, these standards initially developed because the preliminary injunction
proceeding occurred in Chancery while the eventual trial would occur in a court of law. Leubsdorf, supra
note 27, at 530–33.
41. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553
U.S. 674, 689–90 (2008)).
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hardship to the parties of granting or denying relief, and [4] sometimes the impact
of relief on the public interest.”42 Courts have differed as to how they apply these
factors, however, and both courts and commentators have disagreed as to whether
the plaintiff needs to make a strong showing on each element independently,43 or
whether the factors should be evaluated on a “sliding scale” where more serious,
more probable harms demand a lower showing of likelihood of success at trial.44
In his classic article on preliminary injunctions, John Leubsdorf argued that
“the preliminary injunction standard should aim to minimize the probable
irreparable loss of rights caused by errors incident to hasty decision.”45 He thereby
endorsed a sliding-scale type model, where the judge multiplies the plaintiff’s
likelihood of success by the prospective harm to the plaintiff of denying the
injunction and compares that to the defendant’s likelihood of success times the
prospective harm to defendant of granting the injunction.46 Under this sliding-scale
regime, a greater likelihood of success can offset a lower level of harm, and vice
versa. The relevant harm, Leubsdorf notes, is “harm resulting from an erroneous
preliminary decision” that “final relief cannot redress.”47 This understanding of
harm, then, distinguishes preliminary injunctions from permanent injunctions. The
court should grant the preliminary injunction when the probable irreparable loss of
rights to the plaintiff, if the injunction is denied, exceeds the probable irreparable
loss of rights to the defendant if the injunction is granted.48 At least one
commentator has concluded that the Leubsdorf economic model, later adopted by
Judge Posner, has “emerged as the triumphant, dominant theory of preliminary
injunctions.”49
The Supreme Court somewhat clarified the standard for awarding preliminary
injunctions in 2008’s Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council.50 The Court
proclaimed that “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he
is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that
an injunction is in the public interest.”51 The Ninth Circuit had held that if the
42. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 525.
43. Cf. Morton Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction: Time for a Uniform Federal
Standard, 22 REV. LITIG. 495, 538 (2003) (“If the moving party is able to demonstrate the primary
necessity for a preliminary injunction, it should then be required to demonstrate at least a 50% chance
of success on the merits.”).
44. See, e.g., All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir. 2011) (Mosman,
J., concurring) (“A sliding scale approach, including the ‘serious questions’ test, preserves the flexibility
that is so essential to handling preliminary injunctions, and that is the hallmark of relief in equity.”).
45. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 540–41; see also Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780
F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (majority opinion).
46. See Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 542.
47. Id. at 541.
48. Id. at 542.
49. Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109,
154 (2001).
50. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
51. Id. at 20.

First to Printer_Wittlin.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

6/5/20 9:09 PM

META-EVIDENCE AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS

1339

plaintiff demonstrates a strong likelihood of success, it need only show a possibility
of irreparable harm.52 The Supreme Court rejected this idea, citing the standard,
which specifies that irreparable injury absent an injunction must be “likely.”53
The Court did not go so far as to reject sliding-scale tests entirely, however,
and it ultimately decided the case based on the balance of equities and the public
interest.54 Justice Ginsburg in dissent suggested that, even after Winter, courts can
sometimes award “relief based on a lower likelihood of harm when the likelihood
of success is very high.”55 She noted that the hallmark of equity is flexibility, which
permits courts to eschew “particular, predetermined quant[a] of probable success
or injury” and instead use a sliding scale.56 Courts have differed in their reaction to
Winter.57 The Second,58 Third,59 Seventh,60 and Ninth61 Circuits kept their
(somewhat varied) sliding-scale standards, which, with one possible exception,62
allow a lower likelihood-of-success showing when the balance of harms tips strongly
in favor of an injunction. Conversely, Winter addressed whether courts could allow
a weaker irreparable harm showing in the face of a strong likelihood of success. The
Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, deemed its sliding-scale standard untenable in
Winter’s wake and now requires “that the plaintiff make a clear showing that it will
likely succeed on the merits at trial.”63 The Tenth Circuit came to a similar
conclusion.64 Overall, while its influence was somewhat muted by Winter, both the
52. Id. at 21.
53. Id. at 22 (emphasis omitted).
54. Id. at 26.
55. Id. at 51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“This Court has never rejected that formulation, and I
do not believe it does so today.”).
56. Id.
57. See generally Bethany M. Bates, Note, Reconciliation After Winter: The Standard for
Preliminary Injunctions in Federal Courts, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1522 (2011).
58. See Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d
30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The ‘serious questions’ standard permits a district court to grant a preliminary
injunction in situations where it cannot determine with certainty that the moving party is more likely
than not to prevail on the merits of the underlying claims, but where the costs outweigh the benefits
of not granting the injunction.”).
59. See Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that “a movant
for preliminary equitable relief must meet the threshold for the first two ‘most critical’ factors,” then
the court “considers the remaining two factors and determines in its sound discretion if all four factors,
taken together, balance in favor of granting the requested preliminary relief”).
60. See Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721,
725 (7th Cir. 2009) (“How strong a claim on the merits is enough depends on the balance of harms: the
more net harm an injunction can prevent, the weaker the plaintiff’s claim on the merits can be while
still supporting some preliminary relief.”).
61. See All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2011) (“‘[S]erious
questions going to the merits’ and a hardship balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support
issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two elements of the Winter test are also met.”).
62. See Reilly, 858 F.3d at 176–79 (requiring a threshold showing that the movant “can win on
the merits”).
63. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2009).
64. See Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d 1276, 1282 (10th Cir. 2016)
(“Under Winter’s rationale, any modified test which relaxes one of the prongs for preliminary relief and
thus deviates from the standard test is impermissible.”).
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Ginsburg dissent and the continued use of sliding-scale tests in several circuits
indicate that Leubsdorf’s underlying theory retains purchase in the federal courts.65
The procedural and evidentiary regime governing preliminary injunction
motions is the focus of the next Section and, indeed, the rest of this Article.
B. Evidence and Preliminary Injunctions
This Section addresses how federal courts currently evaluate the admissibility
of evidence at the preliminary injunction stage. It shows that in decisions addressing
the issue, courts overwhelmingly do not apply the FRE—they uniformly reject
application of the rule against hearsay, and some courts will not entertain objections
under other rules as well. In addition, some courts suggest judges should not exclude
evidence at all at the preliminary injunction stage. This Section then discusses how
these published decisions do not capture the full practice of the courts. Ultimately,
the general pattern among district courts is that they tend to admit most evidence
and give it the weight they deem proper.
When circuit courts have discussed admissibility of evidence for purposes of
preliminary injunction motions, they have frequently cited the Supreme Court case,
University of Texas v. Camenisch.66 In explaining why a lower court’s finding on the
“likelihood of success on the merits” factor was not tantamount to an actual
decision on the merits, the Court stated:
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative
positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held. Given this
limited purpose, and given the haste that is often necessary if those
positions are to be preserved, a preliminary injunction is customarily granted on
the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than
in a trial on the merits.67
Camenisch thus both summarized practice to that point and set the stage for more
direct dismissal of the FRE in the preliminary injunction context.
The question of whether the FRE apply at the preliminary injunction stage has
arisen most frequently in the context of whether a district court should exclude
hearsay. Every circuit to consider whether hearsay can be considered on a
preliminary injunction motion has concluded that it can.68 Specifically, the First,69

65. See Bates, supra note 57, at 1543.
66. Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (1981); see, e.g., G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester
Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 725 (4th Cir. 2016); Mullins v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 47, 52 (2d
Cir. 2010); Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 718 (3d Cir. 2004); Heideman v. South Salt
Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003).
67. Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395 (emphasis added).
68. See generally Michael J. Lichtenstein, Settling the Law in the Circuits: Presenting Hearsay
Evidence in a Preliminary Injunction Hearing, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 415 (2005).
69. See Asseo v. Pan Am. Grain Co., 805 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1986).
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Second,70 Third,71 Fourth,72 Fifth,73 Seventh,74 Ninth,75 Tenth,76 and Eleventh77
Circuits have all set standards that permit hearsay at the preliminary injunction stage.
The Sixth, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits appear not to have addressed the issue,
although the Sixth Circuit has acknowledged that courts sometimes receive
inadmissible evidence on preliminary injunction motions,78 and district courts
within the Sixth Circuit often admit hearsay.79
While each of these courts’ standards disposes of the rule against hearsay in
the preliminary injunction context, the standards aren’t precisely identical.
Specifically, they suggest potentially divergent answers to two questions: First,
should courts evaluate whether to admit or exclude hearsay evidence, even though
they are not bound by the FRE, or should they just admit all evidence? And second,
are these decisions limited to the rule against hearsay, or are courts free to disregard
all of the rules of evidence?
1. Evaluation of Hearsay Admissibility
Some circuits suggest that while courts may consider hearsay evidence on
preliminary injunction motions, judges should still evaluate whether to admit or
exclude evidence. The First Circuit was, appropriately, the first circuit to articulate
this sort of standard. In Asseo v. Pan American Grain Co., the court noted,
“[a]ffidavits and other hearsay materials are often received in preliminary injunction
proceedings,” and explained, “[t]he dispositive question is not their classification as
hearsay but whether, weighing all the attendant factors, including the need for
expedition, this type of evidence was appropriate given the character and objectives

70. See Mullins, 626 F.3d at 52.
71. See Kos Pharm., Inc., 369 F.3d at 718–19.
72. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 725–26 (4th Cir. 2016).
73. See Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir. 1993).
74. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 412 n.8 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories,
Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir. 1997).
75. See Flynt Distribution Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984).
76. See Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003). Heideman was
the one case that did not arise in the context of considering hearsay. Rather, in distinguishing a
preliminary injunction hearing from a trial on the merits, the court noted, “[t]he Federal Rules of
Evidence do not apply to preliminary injunction hearings.” Id.
77. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1995).
78. Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 535 n.2 (6th Cir. 2014); see
also Unsecured Creditors Comm. of DeLorean Motor Co. v. DeLorean (In re DeLorean Motor Co.), 755
F.2d 1223, 1230 n.4 (6th Cir. 1985) (“The parties assume that the Federal Rules of Evidence are fully
applicable to a hearing on a motion for summary judgment. We express no opinion on this question. But
see 11 C[HARLES ALAN] WRIGHT & A[RTHUR R.] MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2949 (1973) (affidavits may be used to support preliminary injunction; ‘trial court should be allowed
to give even inadmissible evidence some weight’).”).
79. See Damon’s Rests., Inc. v. Eileen K Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 607, 620 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (“The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not explicitly stated whether hearsay evidence
may be considered in the context of a preliminary injunction hearing. . . . This Court, however, and
other district courts within this circuit have considered such evidence, as have numerous other
circuit courts.”).
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of the injunctive proceeding.”80 Several other circuits have adopted the
Asseo standard.81
Sometimes district courts evaluate admissibility.82 This reasoning is typically
fairly cursory,83 but sometimes it’s more detailed.84 Although courts that both
recognize this more relaxed standard and evaluate the admissibility of hearsay
evidence usually admit it, courts occasionally do exclude evidence after evaluation.85
Other courts do not evaluate the admissibility based on an explicit standard but do
state that courts have discretion to consider or not consider evidentiary submissions
on a motion for a preliminary injunction.86 Indeed, several courts of appeals have
indicated that evidentiary determinations at the preliminary injunction stage should

80. Asseo v. Pan Am. Grain Co., 805 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1986). In Asseo, the injunction was
requested pursuant to section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 24. The court evaluated
the propriety of the relief under the usual preliminary injunction standards. See id. at 26.
81. See Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 718–19 (3d Cir. 2004); SEC v. Cherif,
933 F.2d 403, 412 n.8 (7th Cir. 1991); Levi Strauss & Co., 51 F.3d at 985 (Eleventh Circuit).
82. See, e.g., Amadi v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 245 F. Supp. 3d 316, 319 (D. Mass. 2017)
(evaluating affidavits under the Asseo standard and deciding not to strike them); Pendergest-Holt
v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, No. H-09-3712, 2010 WL 3359528, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23,
2010) (evaluating evidence under a “relaxed” standard to ensure only reliable evidence is admitted).
83. See, e.g., RB Jai Alai, L.L.C. v. Sec’y of the Fla. Dep’t of Transp., No. 6:13-cv-1167-Orl40GJK, 2014 WL 12617740, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2014) (“There is nothing to suggest that Birdoff’s
or Catina’s affidavits are inappropriate in light of the character and objectives of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Preliminary Injunction . . . .”); Novosel v. Wrenn, No. 10-cv-165-PB, 2011 WL 2633026, at *7 n.2
(D.N.H. Feb. 16, 2011) (“The preliminary injunction hearing presented sufficient bases for considering
Mijo’s hearsay statements as evidence of the truth of the matters asserted . . . .”); Aviara Parkway Farms,
Inc. v. Agropecuaria La Finca, S.P.R. de R.L., No. 08 CV 2301 JM (CAB), 2009 WL 249790, at *4
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009) (“Given the expeditious and complex nature of this proceeding, the declarative
evidence has been considered by the court.”); In re Ameriquest Mortg. Co., No. 05-CV-7097, 2006 WL
1525661, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 2006) (“Given the size of the putative class, the stage of this litigation,
the purpose of the relief sought, counsel’s declarations that Ameriquest borrowers in fact provided
them with the NORTCs, and the number, consistency and clarity of the forms themselves, it is
appropriate to consider the NORTCs submitted by counsel.”); CCBN.com, Inc. v. c-call.com, Inc., 73
F. Supp. 2d 106, 113 (D. Mass. 1999) (“Plaintiff’s affidavits contain sufficiently reliable and relevant
information to overcome defendant’s hearsay objection.”).
84. See, e.g., Westernbank P.R. v. Kachkar, No. 07-1606(ADC), 2009 WL 2871160, at *21
(D.P.R. Sept. 1, 2009) (discussing circumstances that lend credibility to an affidavit); Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. CCC Holdings Inc., No. 08-2043(RMC), 2009 WL 10631282, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2009)
(reasoning that the court will consider hearsay, but not double hearsay or unsworn declarations because
they lack sufficient reliability).
85. See, e.g., A.A. v. Raymond, No. 2:13-cv-01167-KJM-EFB, 2013 WL 3816565, at *7
(E.D. Cal. July 22, 2013) (“The court sustains defendant’s objections to hearsay in the Casillas
declaration.” The court noted that while it sustained several objections, it would “otherwise consider[ ]
the objections in assigning appropriate weight to the evidence.”); X17, Inc. v. Lavandeira, No.
CV06-7608-VBF( JCX), 2007 WL 790061, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007) (noting that “this Court will
continue to observe the prohibition against hearsay evidence” and excluding certain exhibits
and testimony).
86. See, e.g., McGehee v. Hutchinson, No. 4:17-cv-00179 KGB, 2017 WL 1399554, at *4
(E.D. Ark. Apr. 15, 2017), vacated on other grounds, 854 F.3d 488 (8th Cir. 2017); Rice v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 2 F. Supp. 3d 25, 31 (D. Mass. 2014) (“[T]his court has broad discretion in deciding what evidence
to consider in connection with a motion for preliminary injunction, including hearsay.”).
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be evaluated under an abuse of discretion standard.87 The existence of a standard
of review indicates that courts should be making reviewable decisions—they should
be deciding whether to admit or exclude evidence.
The Second Circuit struck a different note. In Mullins v. City of New York, that
court explained, “[t]he admissibility of hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence
goes to weight, not preclusion, at the preliminary injunction stage.”88 Some district
courts, in line with this suggestion, do not appear to consider whether or not
otherwise inadmissible evidence should be admitted on a preliminary injunction
motion; they effectively admit the evidence automatically.89 The issue, then, is
whether courts explicitly consider admissibility when they decide how much weight
to give the evidence. Some courts admit the evidence without discussing whether
they considered its admissibility for purposes of weighing the evidence.90 Others do
explicitly consider the admissibility of the evidence in determining the weight to
afford it,91 occasionally giving thoughtful and detailed treatment to the question.92

87. See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2744–45 (2015) (“To the extent that the reliability
of Dr. Evans’ testimony is even before us, the District Court’s conclusion that his testimony was based
on reliable sources is reviewed under the deferential ‘abuse-of-discretion’ standard.”); Coal. of
Concerned Citizens to Make Art Smart v. Fed. Transit Admin., 843 F.3d 886, 898–99 (10th Cir. 2016)
(“As for the evidentiary rulings made by the district court in connection with denying the plaintiffs’
motion for preliminary injunction, we apply an abuse of discretion standard.”); Republic of the
Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1363 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (“It was within the discretion of
the district court to accept this hearsay for purposes of deciding whether to issue the
preliminary injunction.”).
88. Mullins v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 2010).
89. See, e.g., McGehee, 2017 WL 1399554, at *4 (“The Court, therefore, in its discretion will
consider all evidentiary submissions at this stage, giving these submissions appropriate weight, without
regard to whether these evidentiary submissions meet the strict evidentiary requirements . . . .”);
Wildearth Guardians v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, Civ. No. 07-00710 MV/WDS, 2008 WL 11327379, at
*11 (D.N.M. Sept. 30, 2008).
90. See, e.g., Veramark Techs., Inc. v. Bouk, 10 F. Supp. 3d 395, 401 (W.D.N.Y. 2014)
(overruling admissibility objections because “the rules of evidence are not strictly applied”); Todd
v. RWI Acquisition L.L.C., No. 2:12-CV-00114-MCA-GBW, 2012 WL 12882371, at *5 (D.N.M. June
12, 2012) (“Because the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to hearings on preliminary injunctions,
the Court denies Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike . . . .”); Keep a Breast Found. v. Seven Grp., No. 11-cv00570 BEN (WMc), 2011 WL 2940290, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Cal. July 19, 2011) (“As noted in the Order to
Show Cause, however, courts may consider otherwise inadmissible evidence for Rule 65 purposes. . . .
Therefore, Defendants’ evidentiary objections are overruled.”); R.B. ex rel. Parent v. Mastery Charter
Sch., 762 F. Supp. 2d 745, 747 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2010); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Am. Metals
Exch. Corp., 693 F. Supp. 168, 173 (D.N.J. 1988) (“I accepted all evidence mindful that hearsay
materials and evidence other than live testimony are properly considered by the Court in preliminary
injunction proceedings.”).
91. See, e.g., CF 135 Flat L.L.C. v. Triadou SPV N.A., 15-CV-5345(AJN), 2016 WL 5945912, at
*2 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2016) (“While the fact that certain evidence is hearsay ‘goes to [the] weight’
that the Court may afford certain evidence, it is not a basis for ‘preclusion’ at this stage.”) (alteration in
original); Phelps-Roper v. Heineman, No. 4:09CV3268, 2010 WL 2015269, at *2 (D. Neb. May 19,
2010) (“The questionable reliability of certain evidence will be considered by the Court when it
determines what weight the evidence should be given.”).
92. See, e.g., USA Visionary Concepts, L.L.C. v. MR Int’l, L.L.C., No. 4:09-CV-00874-DGK,
2009 WL 10672094, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 17, 2009) (giving limited weight to hearsay of questionable
reliability and no weight to comments made during settlement discussions so as not “to deter parties
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Often, courts parrot the refrain that evidentiary concerns “go to weight rather
than admissibility.”93
Finally, district courts sometimes appear to apply the FRE with full force in
the preliminary injunction context.94 In these cases, the parties may not have
disputed that the FRE apply at this stage; they may have simply argued the
evidentiary issues under the Rules.95
Some courts exclude evidence at the preliminary injunction stage; some don’t.
Some courts consider the FRE when determining weight; some may not. Do these
differences in practice make any difference in the end? It is difficult to say. Under
both the Asseo regime and the Mullins regime, the court considers whether a
particular piece of evidence will help it make a well-founded decision on the motion.
The court may be guided by the FRE and its underlying principles of reliability, but
the court is never bound by those Rules. Judges retain substantial discretion to use
the evidence as they see fit.
2. Non-Hearsay Rules
At the preliminary injunction stage, the most common evidentiary issues relate
to hearsay, and federal courts of appeals have not explicitly considered whether
other rules of evidence apply. However, the Tenth Circuit has stated its practice
categorically, untethered from the hearsay context: “The Federal Rules of Evidence
do not apply to preliminary injunction hearings.”96 Unusually, the court announced
this broad statement of law not in response to any particular challenged evidence
but rather in its “Standards of Review” section concerning the review of a
preliminary injunction denial for abuse of discretion. District courts within the
Tenth Circuit have taken the declaration at face value, generally admitting evidence

from engaging in settlement discussions”); Zeneca Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 99 CIV.1452( JGK), 1999
WL 509471, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1999) (“The Court has, nevertheless, applied the Federal Rules of
Evidence in determining the weight to be accorded the evidence that was introduced and has also
assessed whether the evidence would be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.”)
93. See, e.g., Am. Hotel & Lodging Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1185
(C.D. Cal. 2015).
94. See, e.g., Spurlock v. Fox, No. 3:09-cv-0756, 2010 WL 3807167 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 23, 2010)
(considering a litany of objections to evidence presented at a preliminary injunction hearing); Schering
Corp. v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 7000(LMM), 1999 WL 144921 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1999), vacated, 189
F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 1999).
95.
See Defendants’ Motion to Strike Evidence Presented During the Preliminary Injunction
Hearing and Memorandum in Support Thereof, Spurlock, No. 3:09-cv-0756, 2010 WL 3807167, ECF
No. 128; Plaintiffs’ Reply to Defendants’ Motion to Strike and Motions in Limine, id., ECF No. 130.
96. Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003).
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without regard to the FRE,97 and it has now become boilerplate.98 Similarly, the
Ninth Circuit has noted in a footnote that “the rules of evidence do not apply strictly
to preliminary injunction proceedings.”99
But do district courts actually consider evidence that violates rules other than
the rule against hearsay? Different district courts appear to have taken different
approaches to this question. I have specifically looked at whether courts have
applied Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert100—which require a judge to act
as a gatekeeper for expert evidence, ensuring that the factfinder considers only
reliable evidence—at the preliminary injunction phase. (Courts have noted that
Daubert is less important in bench trials than in jury trials, but it still applies.) I have
also examined whether they apply Rule 408, which targets statements made during
settlement negotiations.
Some courts, citing the above cases, have declined to apply Rule 702 and
Daubert. These courts admit the expert evidence independent of its reliability, but
they often consider the parties’ Daubert arguments when weighing the testimony.101
Similarly, some courts have admitted the evidence but used Daubert to determine
whether the evidence should receive any weight.102 This is somewhat similar to the

97. See, e.g., Todd v. RWI Acquisition L.L.C., No. 2:12-CV-00114-MCA-GBW, 2012 WL
12882371, at *5 (D.N.M. June 12, 2012) (“Because the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to
hearings on preliminary injunctions, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike . . . . The parties’
arguments pertain to the weight of the evidence, but not its admissibility.”).
98. See, e.g., Navajo Health Found.—Sage Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Burwell, 100 F. Supp. 3d 1122,
1126 (D.N.M. 2015); Wildearth Guardians v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, No. 07-00710 MV/WDS, 2008 WL
11327379, at *11 (D.N.M. Sept. 30, 2008).
99. Herb Reed Enters., L.L.C. v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 n.5 (9th
Cir. 2013).
100. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
101. See McGehee v. Hutchinson, No. 4:17-cv-00179 KGB, 2017 WL 1399554, at *4
(E.D. Ark. Apr. 15, 2017) (declining to apply Daubert at the preliminary injunction stage but carefully
weighting the expert evidence in accordance with its reliability); Tex. Med. Providers Performing
Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 942, 956 (W.D. Tex. 2011), vacated in part on other grounds, 667
F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012) (concluding arguments that declarations did not satisfy Daubert and were
otherwise inadmissible under the FRE “lack[ed] merit” because courts may rely on otherwise
inadmissible evidence); Half Price Books, Records, Magazines, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, L.L.C.,
No. Civ.A. 302CV2518-G, 2003 WL 23175432, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2003) (“[B]ecause the court
is permitted to give weight to otherwise inadmissible evidence when considering an application for
a preliminary injunction, Half Price’s motion to exclude the Gelb Report is denied.”); Greenpeace
Found. v. Daley, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1114 (D. Haw. 2000) (“Even assuming portions of
Mr. Karnella’s declaration are offered in violation of Rule 702, they need not be stricken. The Court
considers the declaration in its entirety, and accords it the weight that is appropriate in light of Plaintiffs’
objections.”); see also Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1181–83, 1188 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(applying Daubert nominally, but admitting expert declaration despite serious problems with reliability,
and ultimately giving report “very little weight” as it “misrepresents the Standards of Care;
overwhelmingly relies on generalizations about gender dysphoric prisoners, rather than an
individualized assessment of Norsworthy; contains illogical inferences; and admittedly includes
references to a fabricated anecdote”).
102. See, e.g., A.A. v. Raymond, No. 2:13-cv-01167-KJM-EFB, 2013 WL 3816565, at *4
(E.D. Cal. July 22, 2013) (“[A] trial court may admit expert testimony for purposes of
a preliminary injunction evidentiary hearing and conduct its Daubert analysis in tandem with its
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practice in bench trials, where courts regularly take expert testimony and then, once
they have heard it, decide whether it satisfies the requirements of Daubert.103
A substantial number of courts, however, have applied Daubert at the
preliminary injunction phase.104 On occasion, judges have even deemed experts
unqualified to testify at this stage and excluded their testimony.105 What
distinguishes these cases from the cases that decline to apply Daubert? In none of
the cited cases did the court consider whether the Rule should not apply at the
preliminary injunction phase. From all appearances, it seems that one party moved
to exclude the witness’s testimony, the other party responded with its own Daubert
arguments, and the court resolved the evidentiary dispute under Rule 702.
A similar dynamic has played out with Rule 408, which excludes statements
made during settlement negotiations for purposes of proving the validity or amount

assessment of the evidence’s weight. . . . Even in these cases, the court must still conduct
the Daubert analysis and make an explicit finding of the expert testimony’s reliability . . . .”); Oklahoma
ex rel. Edmondson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 05-CV-329-GKF-SAJ, 2008 WL 4453098, at *4
(N.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 2008) (“Upon consideration of the evidence presented, the Court concludes that
the testimony and conclusions of expert witnesses Harwood and Olsen presented at the hearing are not
sufficiently reliable under the standards enunciated in Daubert.”); cf. Pass & Seymour, Inc. v. Hubbell
Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 418, 436–37 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Upon a motion for a preliminary injunction a
court must be guided by the evidentiary principles which would apply at trial and govern the
admissibility of evidence, including in the form of expert testimony. . . . While ultimately the extent, if
any, of expert testimony to be permitted from Mr. McGlynn will be a determination for the trial court,
I have treated portions of his affidavit which appear to be more in the nature of a legal conclusion as a
memorandum, with no particular evidentiary value.”).
103. See Metavante Corp. v. Emigrant Sav. Bank, 619 F.3d 748, 760 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Although
we have held that the court in a bench trial need not make [Daubert] reliability determinations before
evidence is presented . . . the determinations must still be made at some point.”).
104. See, e.g., Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 783 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he
district judge’s decision to admit the expert testimony of Dr. David Lodge . . . reflects a proper
application of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.”); FTC v. BF Labs Inc., No. 4:14-CV-00815-BCW, 2014
WL 7238080, at *2 n.3 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 12, 2014); Healthpoint, Ltd. v. Stratus Pharm., Inc.,
No. SA-00-CA-726-PM, 2002 WL 34364150, at *5 n.17 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2002) (“In connection with
the consideration of his testimony and the survey for purposes of the findings of fact and conclusions
of law entered on preliminary injunctive relief, because Mr. Johnson’s testimony and survey was the
subject of a Daubert challenge, the Court entered Daubert findings.”); Charter Nat’l Bank
& Tr. v. Charter One Fin., Inc., No. 01 C 0905, 2001 WL 1035721, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2001) (“[W]e
cannot find Professor Lichtman qualified as an expert.”); CBS, Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 9
F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (evaluating expert testimony under Rule 703 while not
countenancing a hearsay objection); A Woman’s Choice–E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 980
F. Supp. 962, 973 n.6 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (applying Daubert to social science testimony relating to the
burden of abortion laws); Transcript of Record at 35, Warner v. Gross, No. 5:14-cv-0665-F, 2014 WL
7671680 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014) (“The Tenth Circuit has made it very clear that once a Daubert
challenge is filed, the Court must make its findings on the record indicating its resolution of the
Daubert challenge.”).
105. United States v. Prater, No. CIV8:002CV2052T23MSS, 2002 WL 32107640, at *3 n.2
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2002) (“Because Mr. Rose qualifies neither as a lay witness under Rule 701 nor as
an expert witness under Rule 702, Federal Rules of Evidence, Mr. Rose’s testimony and the instructional
video are excluded.”); Charter Nat’l Bank & Tr., 2001 WL 1035721, at *6 (excluding testimony after
noting, “[a]s a trial court, we must function as a ‘gatekeeper’ with respect to the screening of expert
testimony in order to assure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony”).
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of a disputed claim or impeaching a witness.106 Unlike the rule against hearsay or
Daubert, Rule 408 does not primarily police evidentiary reliability; instead, it serves
to promote desired behavior: free discussion during settlement.107 If courts may
consider statements made during settlement negotiations at the preliminary
injunction stage, that would undermine the incentives created by the Rule. However,
some courts have suggested that even this Rule might not apply in the preliminary
injunction context,108 or they have declined to apply the Rule but then given the
evidence no weight, so as not to deter settlement talks.109 But again, courts
sometimes do not consider whether the FRE apply at this stage: instead, they simply
address Rule 408 motions as they arise.110
It seems, then, that courts follow one of three practices: they acknowledge that
the FRE don’t apply at this stage and accept all evidence; they acknowledge that the
FRE don’t apply, accept all evidence, and then explicitly decline to give significant
weight to inadmissible or unreliable evidence; or they do not consider whether the
FRE applies and decide to admit or exclude evidence based on the
parties’ arguments.
This final practice suggests that the standard-setting court of appeals decisions
do not fully represent actual court practice. The next Section discusses how
preliminary injunction practice may look different on the ground than it does in the
circuit-level case law.
3. Unreported Court Practice
I spoke with several federal judges who handle preliminary injunction motions
to get a better understanding of how these hearings work in practice. Our
conversations suggested that procedures between courts differ, although some
common themes emerged.

106. FED. R. EVID. 408.
107. See FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note to proposed rule (“[A] more consistently
impressive ground is promotion of the public policy favoring the compromise and settlement
of disputes.”).
108. See, e.g., Doe #1 ex rel. Lee v. Sevier Cty., No. 3:17-CV-41, 2017 WL 1026491, at *4
(E.D. Tenn. Mar. 15, 2017) (“For the Court to accommodate John Does’ request under Rule 408, it
would need far more in the way of specifics, and that is only if the Court assumes the Federal Rules of
Evidence even remotely apply to the evidentiary hearing—an issue that John Does, again, have left
unaddressed.”); cf. Jackson v. N’Genuity Enters. Co., No. 09 C 6010, 2011 WL 4628683, at *23
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2011) (suggesting that the rule against character evidence does not apply in
this context).
109. See USA Visionary Concepts, L.L.C. v. MR Int’l L.L.C., No. 4:09-CV-00874-DGK, 2009
WL 10672094, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 17, 2009).
110. See, e.g., R.G.I.S. L.L.C. v. A.S.T. Inc., No. 07-10975, 2008 WL 878908, at *4
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2008) (“[T]he Court agrees that Rule 408 prohibits the use of the Agreement to
prove liability, and therefore that the preliminary injunction should not issue at this time . . . .”);
Seroctin Research & Techs., Inc. v. Unigen Pharm., Inc., 541 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1240 n.1 (D. Utah 2008)
(granting in part a motion to strike evidence under Rule 408).
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A major difference—even among these five judges from within three
circuits—was how quickly the court tends to hold the hearing and, relatedly, what
kind of evidence predominates. One judge tended to move more quickly—often
asking the parties to consolidate the preliminary injunction hearing with a hearing
on a temporary restraining order.111 She said she encourages affidavit
evidence—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(c) allows judges to hear motions on
affidavits—as opposed to live testimony.112 Another judge, who was unlikely to
consolidate the motions, said she typically takes affidavits as direct evidence but
requires the affiants to be present at the preliminary injunction hearing and available
for cross-examination.113 A magistrate judge—who usually hears preliminary
injunction motions after a temporary restraining order is already in place—said
parties often want discovery before the preliminary injunction hearing, and the
hearing tends to look more like a trial on the merits, with live testimony and
cross-examination.114 She said she rarely, if ever, decides preliminary injunctions
on affidavits.115
The judges generally said they entertained evidentiary objections, including
hearsay objections.116 (One speculated that lawyers may incorrectly believe that the
FRE apply, and that’s why they make objections under the rules.117) The judge
whose hearings look more like trials tended to apply the FRE fairly strictly,118 but
the other judges overwhelmingly said they tended to be more lenient in this
context,119 particularly if any flaws in the evidence could be fixed at trial.120 They
said that clearly inadmissible evidence, such as an affidavit with no foundation,
would not be allowed.121 But they generally allow reliable evidence to come
in—several emphasized that “reliability” is key—even if it is excludable under the
FRE.122 They use the parties’ evidentiary objections largely to determine the
appropriate weight of the evidence.123 For example, two judges said they do apply
111. Interview with a United States District Judge within the Eighth Circuit (Oct. 27, 2017)
[hereinafter Eighth Circuit District Judge 1 Interview].
112. Id.
113. Tenth Circuit District Judge 1 Interview, supra note 22.
114. Magistrate Judge Interview, supra note 22.
115. Id.
116. Eighth Circuit District Judge 1 Interview, supra note 111; Magistrate Judge Interview, supra
note 22; Tenth Circuit District Judge 1 Interview, supra note 22.
117. Interview with a United States District Judge within the Tenth Circuit (Nov. 3, 2017)
[hereinafter Tenth Circuit District Judge 2 Interview].
118. Magistrate Judge Interview, supra note 22.
119. Tenth Circuit District Judge 1 Interview, supra note 22.
120. Interview with a United States District Judge within the Eighth Circuit (Oct. 13, 2017)
[hereinafter Eighth Circuit District Judge 2 Interview].
121. Eighth Circuit District Judge 1 Interview, supra note 111; Tenth Circuit District Judge 1
Interview, supra note 22.
122. Eighth Circuit District Judge 1 Interview, supra note 111; Eighth Circuit District Judge 2
Interview, supra note 120; Tenth Circuit District Judge 1 Interview, supra note 22; Tenth Circuit District
Judge 2 Interview, supra note 117.
123. Eighth Circuit District Judge 1 Interview, supra note 111; Eighth Circuit District Judge 2
Interview, supra note 120; Tenth Circuit District Judge 2 Interview, supra note 117.
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the Daubert standard at the preliminary injunction stage, but they tend to apply it
after hearing the expert testimony in order to decide whether to give the testimony
any weight.124
These conversations suggest that preliminary injunction practice varies. Some
judges may apply the FRE more strictly than the circuit courts suggest, while others
have adopted a flexible practice. Certainly, none of the judges suggested preliminary
injunctions are an evidentiary Wild West where anything goes; parties make
evidentiary objections under the FRE, and the judges consider them, whether for
purposes of exclusion or weight. In light of these judges’ comments and the
published decisions, it seems that whether and how a court applies the FRE at the
preliminary injunction stage depends on the judge, the arguments presented by the
parties, and the exigencies of the case. Often, the court will entertain arguments,
decline to exclude the evidence, but give the evidence little or no weight if the
objecting party demonstrates that the evidence is unreliable or otherwise clearly
violates the FRE.125
II. CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT PRACTICE
This highly discretionary, somewhat variable regime is a far cry from trial
proceedings, where the Federal Rules of Evidence govern. Although a number of
the Rules allow for discretion in admitting evidence,126 the discretion is explicitly
guided, and several types of evidence are excluded out of concerns of reliability and
unfair prejudice. Is this departure from the trial norm justified? This Part critiques
the courts of appeals’ approach to evidence in preliminary injunction motions. I
focus on preliminary injunctions, as opposed to temporary restraining orders
(TROs).127 TROs, also permitted by Rule 65, may be issued without notice to the
other party based on facts stated in an affidavit. They may remain in place for no
more than fourteen days, and they address true emergencies. Because the FRCP set
out a specific evidentiary regime for TROs—allowing them issued on affidavits
alone and without any adversarial testing—and because TROs address such
time-sensitive emergencies that any evidence gathering is likely impossible, I do not
critique Rule 65(b) here. I limit my critique to preliminary injunction motions.
I analyze current practice from three angles: text, history, and policy. First, the
FRE and the FRCP do not provide a clear textual basis for departure in the
preliminary injunction context. Second, the current, flexible regime is not an

124. Eighth Circuit District Judge 1 Interview, supra note 111; Tenth Circuit District Judge 1
Interview, supra note 22.
125. Another possibility is that parties may enter into agreements with each other about how to
handle evidentiary issues during preliminary injunction proceedings. Cf. Robert G. Bone, Party
Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1349 (2012)
(discussing pretrial agreements to waive evidence objections). These agreements would show up in
neither the reported caselaw nor conversations with judges.
126. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403; FED. R. EVID. 807.
127. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b).
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inherent feature of equity—historically, courts of equity applied rules of
evidence—although it is a longstanding feature of preliminary injunction practice.
Third, the policy justifications courts have advanced to justify the departure from
the FRE are insufficient. Courts have focused on the limited and preliminary nature
of the remedy and the need to prevent irreparable harm under time pressure. The
first rationale is misguided: preliminary injunctions are often powerful remedies.
The second rationale carries more weight, but enforcing the FRE would not have
consequences as dire as courts have suggested. To demonstrate this, I introduce the
concept of meta-evidence—a key contribution of this Article—and demonstrate
that much evidence that at first appears inadmissible is actually admissible under
the FRE.
A. The Text of the Rules
This unregulated evidentiary regime is not specifically authorized by the FRE
or the FRCP. Under the best textual reading of those Rules, it should probably be
disallowed—the FRE should probably apply to preliminary injunction hearings.
Both the FRCP and the FRE contain a provision instructing courts to interpret
them to promote fairness, justice, efficiency, and in the case of evidence, truth
seeking.128 Courts generally interpret both the FRCP and the FRE using the usual
tools of statutory interpretation: examining the plain meaning of the text, and then
often looking to advisory committee notes or other context to resolve
ambiguities.129 This equivalence between statutes and rules has come under
scholarly fire in the context of the FRCP, which are drafted by an advisory
committee and typically enacted through legislative silence.130 As theories of
statutory interpretation tend to begin from the premise of legislative supremacy,
they do not translate to the FRCP.131 Several scholars have therefore suggested
interpreting these Rules as though they were administrative regulations.132 However,
for questions of law, even these proposals rely on many of the basic tools of
statutory interpretation, including the plain meaning of text and the stated purpose
of its drafters.
Federal Rule of Evidence 1101 governs the applicability of the FRE.133
According to Rule 1101, the FRE “apply to proceedings before . . . United States

128. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; FED. R. EVID. 102.
129. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989) (Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 508–09 (1989) (Federal Rules
of Evidence).
130. The original FRE were enacted by Congress. See Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
131. See Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, Civil Rules Interpretive Theory, 101
MINN. L. REV. 2167, 2183 (2017).
132. See id. at 2225; Elizabeth G. Porter, Pragmatism Rules, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 123,
177 (2015).
133. Section 101(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides: “These rules apply to
proceedings in United States courts. The specific courts and proceedings to which the rules apply, along
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district courts,”134 specifically “civil cases and proceedings.”135 The FRE, then,
apply to both jury trials and bench trials, to both law and equity. Rule 1101(d)
specifies “exceptions,” where the FRE do not apply, including preliminary
questions governing admissibility, grand jury proceedings, and “miscellaneous
proceedings such as: extradition or rendition; issuing an arrest warrant, criminal
summons, or search warrant; a preliminary examination in a criminal case;
sentencing; granting or revoking probation or supervised release; and considering
whether to release on bail or otherwise.”136 In addition, Rule 1101(e) permits other
statutes or federal rules to provide for the admission or exclusion of evidence.
A preliminary injunction proceeding is a civil proceeding before a United
States district court, and it does not appear to fall under any of Rule 1101(d)’s
“exceptions.” The best chance for exclusion is Rule 1101(d)(3)’s exclusion for
with exceptions, are set out in Rule 1101.” FED. R. EVID. 101(a). Section 1101 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence provides, in its entirety:
(a) To Courts and Judges. These rules apply to proceedings before:
• United States district courts;
• United States bankruptcy and magistrate judges;
• United States courts of appeals;
• the United States Court of Federal Claims; and
• the district courts of Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands.
(b) To Cases and Proceedings. These rules apply in:
• civil cases and proceedings, including bankruptcy, admiralty, and maritime cases;
• criminal cases and proceedings; and
• contempt proceedings, except those in which the court may act summarily.
(c) Rules on Privilege. The rules on privilege apply to all stages of a case or proceeding.
(d) Exceptions. These rules—except for those on privilege—do not apply to the following:
(1) the court’s determination, under Rule 104(a), on a preliminary question of fact governing
admissibility;
(2) grand-jury proceedings; and
(3) miscellaneous proceedings such as:
• extradition or rendition;
• issuing an arrest warrant, criminal summons, or search warrant;
• a preliminary examination in a criminal case;
• sentencing;
• granting or revoking probation or supervised release; and
• considering whether to release on bail or otherwise.
(e) Other Statutes and Rules. A federal statute or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court may
provide for admitting or excluding evidence independently from these rules.
FED. R. EVID. 1101.
134. FED. R. EVID. 1101(a); see also FED. R. EVID. 101(a) (“These rules apply to proceedings in
United States courts. The specific courts and proceedings to which the rules apply, along with
exceptions, are set out in Rule 1101.”).
135. FED. R. EVID. 1101(b). Before recent amendments, Rule 1101(b) said the Rules “apply
generally to civil actions and proceedings.” Mueller & Kirkpatrick suggested that the word “generally”
indicated the Rules might not apply to certain motions. 5 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD
C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 11:3 (4th ed. 2009). But the word “generally” is no longer in
the text. See FED. R. EVID. 1101(b). Even though the amendments were not supposed to effect
substantive changes, Mueller & Kirkpatrick note that “there is but one word in the Rules (the qualifier
‘generally’ in Rule 1101) that supports the conclusion that the Rules do not apply to such motions.” 5
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra. This thin rationale no longer applies.
136. FED. R. EVID. 1101(d).
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“miscellaneous proceedings.”137 The examples given in the list are not exhaustive,
as indicated by the introductory phrase “such as,” which was added in the 2011
restyling of the FRE to more accurately capture court practice.138 But under the
principle of noscitur a sociis, “a word is known by the company it keeps,”139 and the
phrase “miscellaneous proceedings” should be read in light of the examples that
follow. Indeed, some courts have recognized that “the federal rule expressly
authorizes federal courts to limit the application of the rules of evidence in situations
that resemble the situations specified in the rule.”140 But a preliminary injunction hearing
does not closely resemble the proceedings listed in Rule 1101(d)(3), all of which
relate to criminal proceedings ancillary to trial. Indeed, courts have found the FRE
not to apply to other ancillary criminal proceedings—such as supervised-release
proceedings, hearings on transfers of criminal defendants, and hearings to
determine whether a defendant can stand trial.141 Preliminary injunction hearings,
as civil proceedings, are distinct.142
The FRCP do not permit additional evidence, with one pertinent
exception: Rule 43(c) provides that “[w]hen a motion relies on facts outside the
record, the court may hear the matter on affidavits or may hear it wholly or partly
on oral testimony or on depositions.”143 This indicates that a court may, in its
discretion, hear motions on affidavits.144
137. FED. R. EVID. 1101(d).
138. See Memorandum from Daniel Capra, Reporter, Evidence Rules Comm., to Advisory
Comm. on Evidence Rules, in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES 235–36 (Apr. 23–24,
2009), https://www.uscourts.gov/file/15559/download [ https://perma.cc/P3HJ-JDYT ] (noting
that “there are a number of proceedings not on the list in which courts have held that the rules are not
applicable,” including “supervised release revocation proceedings and proceedings to determine
whether a juvenile should be tried as an adult”). Deborah Jones Merritt notes that before the restyling,
some courts interpreted Rule 1101(d)(3) as an exhaustive list, and she argues that the addition of “such
as” may have changed the substance of the Rule. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Social Media, the Sixth
Amendment, and Restyling: Recent Developments in the Federal Law of Evidence, 28 TOURO L. REV. 27,
32–36 (2012).
139. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 543 (2015).
140. Parker v. State, 769 S.E.2d 329, 334 (Ga. 2015) (emphasis added).
141. See 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 29, § 8077 n.9; see also 5 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 135, § 11:5 (citing other criminal proceedings in which the Rules do not apply under Rule
1101(d)(3)).
142. There is some resemblance between a preliminary injunction hearing and a bail
hearing: the court determines whether to burden the defendant in order to prevent pre-trial harm.
However, bail hearings occur on a tighter timeframe, often within twenty-four hours of arrest, giving
the defendant little time to prepare. See 2 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 8 (4th ed. 2015). Bail hearings more closely resemble ex parte temporary
restraining order proceedings than preliminary injunction hearings. Cf. Russell M. Gold, Jail as
Injunction, 107 GEO. L.J. 501 (2019) (arguing that pretrial detention determinations should be made
under a standard akin to the preliminary injunction standard).
143. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(c).
144. The court may also use deposition transcripts, which are admissible at trial only under
certain circumstances. See FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a). This rarely comes up at preliminary injunction hearings,
likely because there has typically been insufficient time for discovery at this point, and because the
non-offering party either had the opportunity to examine the deponent or to supplement with
an affidavit.
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Rule 65, which governs preliminary injunction motions, does not expressly
permit otherwise-inadmissible evidence. But it does include one indication that
courts might hear inadmissible evidence on a motion for a preliminary injunction.
Rule 65(a)(2) provides, “evidence that is received on the motion and that would be
admissible at trial becomes part of the trial record and need not be repeated at
trial.”145 This suggests that some evidence received on a preliminary injunction
motion will not be admissible at trial. However, this passage is consistent with
allowing only the affidavits and deposition transcripts provided for in Rule 43(c).
The advisory committee notes offer no clues.
Courts have not seriously addressed the tension between Rule 1101 and
declining to apply the FRE to preliminary injunction motions.146 Those that have
noticed the tension simply use preliminary injunctions as an example of Rule
1101(d)(3) being an inexhaustive list of exceptions.147 In one instance, a court had
relied on Rule 1101(d)(3) to express skepticism about the inapplicability of the FRE
to a temporary restraining order proceeding, but the judge’s skepticism was quelled
by a citation to the case law on preliminary injunctions and hearsay.148
And courts have taken the silence of Rule 65 to indicate a lack of restrictions
on evidence. Whereas Rule 56, which governs motions for summary judgment,
specifies what information is admissible—including requirements for affidavits and
a provision for objections that evidence cannot be presented in admissible
form149—Rule 65 does not. In G.G., the Fourth Circuit cited this comparison to
demonstrate that preliminary injunctions are governed by a laxer evidentiary
regime,150 as has the Third Circuit.151 Wright and Miller suggest that it would be
illogical to impose the strict standards of Rule 56 on preliminary injunction
motions.152 While I agree with these courts that nothing in the Rules requires that
affidavits on a preliminary injunction motion conform to Rule 56(c)(4), this does
not in itself imply that the Rules of Evidence as a whole do not apply. Rather, it
means only that affidavits submitted pursuant to Rule 43(c) are not specifically
governed by Rule 56(c)(4). This does create a tension in the Rules, as Rule 56(c)(4)
145. FED. R. CIV. P. 65 (a)(2).
146. A Westlaw search for “1101(d)!” /p “preliminary injunction!” yields three district court
cases. THOMSON REUTUERS WESTLAW EDGE, https://www.westlaw.com [ https://perma.cc/TT6NMV4V ] (search “1101(d)!” /p “preliminary injunction!” in the search bar using all state and
federal filters).
147. See Forsberg v. Pefanis, 261 F.R.D. 694, 700 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (discussing Arista Records
L.L.C. v. Does 1–27, 584 F. Supp. 2d 240 (D. Me. 2008)); Arista Records, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 255–56
(citing Asseo v. Pan Am. Grain Co., 805 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1986)).
148. See Occupy Denver v. City of Denver, No. 11-cv-03048-REB-MJWW, 2011 WL 6096501,
at *1 n.2 (D. Colo. Dec. 7, 2011) (citing Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182 (10th
Cir. 2003)).
149. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
150. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 725 (4th Cir. 2016).
151. Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 718–19 (3d Cir. 2004).
152. 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 29, § 2949; see also J.P. Morgan Sec. L.L.C. v. Manne,
No. 16-818-JWD-RLB, 2016 WL 7223358, at *2 (M.D. La. Dec. 12, 2016) (order granting temporary
restraining order) (“The Fifth Circuit follows Wright & Miller.”).

First to Printer_Wittlin.docx (Do Not Delete)

1354

6/5/20 9:09 PM

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:1331

effectively requires the affiant’s statements to conform to the Rules of Evidence.
But the tension does not suggest a clear resolution in favor of admissibility.
This rejection of the FRE without explicit authorization is not unique to
preliminary injunction motions: courts have also rejected application of the FRE to
class certification proceedings pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, even though those are also civil proceedings not excepted under Rule
1101(d).153 Linda Mullenix has argued that evidentiary rules should apply to these
proceedings, in part on this textual basis.154 Perhaps the most forceful call for the
Federal Rules of Evidence to apply to preliminary injunction motions under Rules 101
and 1101 has come in a parenthetical in a Chamber of Commerce amicus brief to
the Supreme Court calling for application of the FRE in class certification
proceedings. In its brief, the Chamber stated, “Although Rule 1101(d) contains
certain enumerated exceptions to that general principle, it contains no exception for
class-certification proceedings, or for the many other types of civil pretrial
proceedings (such as preliminary-injunction hearings) at which parties routinely
present evidence.”155 The brief called the conclusion that the Rules apply to class
certification proceedings “inescapable” “[a]s a logical matter.”156
Textually, the FRE and FRCP do not provide for a wholesale rejection of the
Federal Rules of Evidence in the context of preliminary injunction motions. Instead
they provide for a narrow exception: affidavits and depositions. Courts have not
been convinced by the text, however, so I turn to history and policy.
B. Historical Context
The Supreme Court has indicated that “history is a crucial guidepost in
evaluating the scope of federal equitable power.”157 Courts have looked to the equity
tradition to emphasize that the judge, sitting as chancellor, has broad discretion and
flexibility in determining what relief is appropriate.158 Law and equity have
153. See Linda S. Mullenix, Putting Proponents to Their Proof: Evidentiary Rules at Class
Certification, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 606, 636–37 (2014).
154. See id.
155. Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Business
Roundtable, and the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 6, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013) (No. 11-864), 2012 WL 3643755.
156. Id.
157. Lee, supra note 49, at 125; Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc.,
527 U.S. 308, 333 (1999) (“Because such a remedy was historically unavailable from a court of equity,
we hold that the District Court had no authority to issue a preliminary injunction preventing petitioners
from disposing of their assets pending adjudication of respondents’ contract claim for money
damages.”); see also Anthony DiSarro, Freeze Frame: The Supreme Court’s Reaffirmation of the Substantive
Principles of Preliminary Injunctions, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 51, 53 (2011) (“Thus, a static, historical
conception of equity drives the substantive standards for deciding whether to grant injunctive relief.”).
In his concurrence in Trump v. Hawaii, Justice Thomas relied heavily on the history of equity to discuss
the scope of the injunctive remedy. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425–29 (2018) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
158. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 310 (1982) (noting the district court
had “emphasized an equity court’s traditionally broad discretion”).
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merged,159 and the Rules govern all cases, but courts still sometimes invoke
equitable tradition and custom when discussing procedural issues.160 Equity
historically focused on considerations of justice and fairness.161 If nineteenthcentury courts of equity162 had unlimited flexibility with regard to evidentiary issues,
that might suggest that today’s courts considering equitable remedies should
similarly be free to ignore all constraints and do justice in every case.
Although courts of chancery had more evidentiary flexibility than courts of
law, they were hardly unconstrained. The evidentiary regime in early equity courts
may have resembled the civilian law of proof more than the common law.163 But
even in that early period, judges in equity were apparently bound by the rules as they
existed.164 Later, the evidentiary rules of equity and common law converged in many
respects, although practice never aligned precisely.165 “The rules as to evidence are
the same in equity as at law,” declared Lord Hardwicke in 1737.166 He later noted
that having different evidentiary regimes in the two courts could have “mischievous
consequence,” as it could lead to different results on the same issue in different
courts.167 This maxim held across the Pond, as well. In the United States, the
evidentiary rules in equity differed from those at law in only a limited class of
cases,168 and equity treatises repeated the maxim, “In general it may be stated that
the rules of evidence are the same in equity as they are at law.”169
159. See FED. R. CIV. P. 2. This is not to imply that law conquered equity. See generally Stephen
N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
160. See, e.g., Univ. of. Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (“[A] preliminary injunction
is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete
than in a trial on the merits.”) (emphasis added); Eighth Circuit District Judge 1 Interview, supra note
111; see also Mark Spottswood, Live Hearings and Paper Trials, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827, 870 (2011).
161. See Subrin, supra note 159, at 919.
162. When the Supreme Court looks at historical rules of equity, it tends to “draw from the
equity of the middle-to-late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century[,]” as that is the period
“when those rules were most systematically expounded.” Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the
New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997, 1022 (2015). Bray argues that pulling from this convenient period
is not good academic history, but it is sensible history in the context of legal adjudication. Id. at 1001.
Since courts look to this period, and since this period runs directly into the era governed by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, I focus on it as the most sensible reference point.
163. See MICHAEL R. T. MACNAIR, THE LAW OF PROOF IN EARLY MODERN EQUITY 14,
35 (1999).
164. Id. at 294.
165. See RICHARD NEWCOMBE GRESLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN THE
COURTS OF EQUITY 1 (Christopher Alderson Calvert ed., 1847) (“Evidence in the Courts of Equity,
although materially differing in its character and many of its rules from that which is used in the Courts
of Common Law . . . .”).
166. Manning v. Lechmere (1737) 26 Eng. Rep. 288, 288; 1 Atk. 453, 453.
167. See Glynn v. Bank of England (1750) 26 Eng. Rep. 26, 27–28; 2 Ves. Sen. 38, 41.
168. Man v. Ward (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 541; 2 Atk. 228; Glynn 26 Eng. Rep. at 28; 2 Ves. at 42;
3 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 250 (16th ed. 1899).
169. 3 JOSEPH STORY & W.H. LYON, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 564 (14th ed. 1918); see also JOHN ADAMS, THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUITY: A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW AS ADMINISTERED BY THE COURT OF
CHANCERY 44 (8th ed. 1890) (“The general rules of evidence are the same in equity as at law, but the
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The evidentiary regimes of law and equity differed in two important respects.
First, while parties were not competent to testify in courts of law, plaintiffs and
defendants could submit testimony in courts of equity.170 Second, the manner of
taking the evidence differed: in legal cases, tried in front of a jury, the witnesses gave
live testimony, whereas at equity, the evidence was taken in secret via written
interrogatories.171 In equity courts, the evidence was all disclosed simultaneously at
the moment of “publication,” after which no further evidence was admissible
without special leave.172 (In complicated cases, the court might assign a “master,”
who could seek out additional evidence from the parties.173 The master might take
testimony by oral examination with the parties present.174) This practice evolved
over time—the Federal Equity Rules of 1842 allowed parties to consent to an
evidence-taking procedure more like a deposition than a written interrogatory.175
But federal judges sitting in equity relied on written evidence—interrogatories,
transcripts, pleadings, and written documentation176—until the New Federal Equity
Rules went into effect in 1913.177 Even after 1913, courts continued to hear motions
on affidavits at the preliminary injunction stage.178
The written nature of the evidence at equity does not suggest a major
breakdown in the rules; rather, courts distinguished between the rules of evidence
and the mode or manner of taking evidence.179 As the central purpose of taking
evidence in equity was “to elicit a sworn detail of facts on which the court may
adjudge the equities,” not to resolve conflicts between witnesses, written
interrogatories sufficed as a manner of taking evidence.180 But the difference in
manner of taking it is different.”); C.L. BATES, FEDERAL EQUITY PROCEDURE (1901) (“It is a
fundamental principle that courts of equity follow the common-law rules of evidence . . . .”); 3
GREENLEAF, supra note 168, § 250 (“The rules of Evidence, as to the matter of fact, as Lord Hardwicke
long since remarked, are generally the same in equity as at law.”).
170. STORY & LYON, supra note 169, at 564.
171. See ADAMS, supra note 169, at 44–45, 365.
172. See id. at 45.
173. See AMALIA D. KESSLER, INVENTING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGAL CULTURE, 1800–1877, at 26, 52 (2017).
174. See id. at 82–83, 87; Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due
Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1226 (2005)
(citing Rule 77 of the Federal Equity Rules of 1842).
175. See FED. EQUITY R. 67 (1842) (repealed in 1938 with the adoption of the FRCP), in JAMES
LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 119–20 (7th ed. 1930); Kessler, supra note 174,
at 1230–31.
176. See KESSLER, supra note 173, at 70–71; Kessler, supra note 174, at 1232.
177. HOPKINS, supra note 175, at 240 (reproducing Federal Rule of Equity 46, which read, “In
all trials in equity the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, except as otherwise
provided by statute or these rules . . . .” and noting that the rule was new). Beginning in 1893, the court
could, in its discretion, allow testimony to be received in open court. But that was not the default
practice. See Kessler, supra note 174, at 1232–33.
178. FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 55, 67–68 (1930).
179. See Charles C. Callahan & Edwin E. Ferguson, Evidence and the New Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 45 YALE L. J. 622, 625 n.13 (1936) (citing first Bryant v. Leyland, 6 F. 125, 127 (C.C.D. Mass.
1881); and then citing Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co. v. Kendall, 167 F. 62, 65 (8th Cir. 1909)).
180. ADAMS, supra note 169, at 45.
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manner of taking evidence did not alter other evidence rules, such as competency.181
The system of gathering evidence differed greatly between the two systems; the rules
of evidence differed far less.
The rule against hearsay applied in English equity courts, as well as in common
law, by the mid-nineteenth century.182 The rule was relatively late to develop: it did
not apply with rigor in either law or equity during most of their separate existence.
A few early equity cases suggest that hearsay is different from sworn testimony, and
courts should give it little, if any, weight.183 Other cases indicate that a witness must
testify on the basis of his knowledge, not merely his belief.184 But the exclusionary
rule against hearsay likely did not solidify until around the late eighteenth or early
nineteenth century—until then, use of hearsay was apparently within the court’s
discretion, even at English common law.185
Also, there was some additional flexibility in equity, beyond that at law. One
treatise notes that if it would be “inconvenient and unreasonably expensive” to
produce evidence in the regular manner in a court of equity, the court could allow
the normally inadmissible evidence by special order.186
And at least by the mid-nineteenth century, American equity courts did allow
additional flexibility at preliminary injunction proceedings. One court noted
specifically that “[u]pon the hearing of a motion for a preliminary injunction, the
rules of evidence are applied less strictly than upon the final hearing of the cause,
and consequently evidence that would not be competent in support of an
application for a perpetual injunction should be admitted.”187
The rules of evidence at equity, then, contained more flexibility than the rules
of evidence at law, and the manner of taking evidence was different; but courts still
faced constraints and largely adhered to the rules. However, courts do have a long

181. Manning v. Lechmere (1737) 26 Eng. Rep. 288, 288; 1 Atk. 453, 453.
182. See GRESLEY, supra note 165, at 304 (“Hearsay is inadmissible . . . .”). I have not found a
treatise on either 19th Century American equity or 19th Century American evidence that discusses
whether the rule against hearsay applied at equity.
183. See MACNAIR, supra note 163, at 260 (quoting Bath & Montague’s Case (1693) 22 Eng.
Rep. 963, 1002; 3 Ch. Cas. 54, 119 (Somers, LK) (“[T]here is no Proof of it; it is at most but an
Hear-say, testified by one Witness.”)).
184. See id.
185. John H. Langbein, The Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the
Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1201 (1996); T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law,
84 IOWA L. REV. 499, 530–37 (1999); Richard D. Friedman, The Mold that Shapes Hearsay Law, 66
FLA. L. REV. 433, 437 n.18 (2014).
186. 3 GREENLEAF, supra note 168, § 340.
187. Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union No. 3, 45 F. 135, 147 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1891)
(noting that evidence was not hearsay and that even if it were, the rules apply less strictly in this context);
see also Green v. City of Lynn, 55 F. 516, 518 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893) (“[T]his question did not arise on a
motion for an ad interim injunction, with reference to which the rules of evidence are not strict, but are
molded to meet the convenience of a summary hearing.”); Buck v. Hermance, 4 F. Cas. 548, 549
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1848) (noting that while a verdict from one case could not be admitted as evidence in
another lawsuit, it could be admitted in a preliminary injunction proceeding, because “[i]n this
preliminary proceeding the parties are not tied down to the strict rules of evidence”).
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history of flexibility at the preliminary injunction stage, which suggests a need for at
least some relief from the FRE at this stage. To see when that is and isn’t necessary,
I turn to policy.
C. Policy Justifications
Courts have advanced two central reasons for permitting inadmissible
evidence in preliminary injunction proceedings: the provisional nature and limited
purpose of the remedy, and the need to prevent irreparable harm given time
constraints. I discuss both. First, I argue that the provisional-and-limited rationale
is unconvincing: preliminary injunctions are often highly consequential, and any
suggestion that evidentiary regulation is unimportant because the findings are
unimportant is misguided. Second, I agree that the need to prevent irreparable harm
before the parties have had a full opportunity for discovery is a weighty concern
that requires compromising the FRE to some degree. However, I demonstrate that
applying the FRE would not be as harmful as courts have suggested. To make this
showing, I introduce the concept of “meta-evidence”—evidence demonstrating
what evidence will be presented at trial. By recognizing that evidence going to
likelihood of success on the merits is meta-evidence, we see that the FRE would
exclude little evidence on this important factor.
1. Provisional Nature and Limited Purpose of Remedy
In University of Texas v. Camenisch, the Supreme Court case that served as the
basis for many of the circuit cases allowing hearsay,188 the court emphasized that
“[t]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions
of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.”189 It reasoned that “[g]iven this
limited purpose, and given the haste that is often necessary if those positions are to
be preserved, a preliminary injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that
are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits.”190 Wright
and Miller note that on motions for summary judgment, it is important to impose
the same evidentiary safeguards that exist at trial because summary judgment is a
substitute for trial. In the preliminary injunction context, however, the order “only
has the effect of maintaining the positions of the parties until the trial can be held;
the order neither replaces the trial nor represents an adjudication of the merits.”191
188. See, e.g., G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 725 (4th Cir. 2016)
(citing Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)); Mullins v. City of New York, 626 F.3d
47, 52 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390); Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700,
718 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390); Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182,
1188 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390).
189. Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395.
190. Id. (emphasis added).
191. 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 29, § 2949; see also Mullins v. City of New York, 634
F. Supp. 2d 373, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“A preliminary injunction is an interim remedy, and the
burdensome requirements of trial testimony are at odds with its provisional purpose.”). Note that the
preliminary injunction in Mullins was truly provisional, as it enjoined penalizing participation in the suit.
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This emphasis on preliminary injunctions as a device that merely preserves the
status quo has a long history192 that continues to present day,193 but as several
scholars have demonstrated,194 it is incomplete. Preliminary injunctions sometimes,
but do not always, preserve the status quo, the existing state of things. Instead,
courts often focus on minimizing or avoiding irreparable harm,195 and “[i]f the
currently existing status quo itself is causing one of the parties irreparable injury, it
is necessary to alter the situation so as to prevent the injury . . . .”196 In the travel
ban cases, for example, courts preliminarily enjoined an executive order that was
already in effect.197 In Camenisch itself,198 the district court’s preliminary injunction
ordered the defendant university to provide an interpreter for the plaintiff, a deaf
student, to assist him in his classes. That, too, disrupted the status quo: the status
quo was Walter Camenisch being disadvantaged in class. On the other hand, the
plaintiff would have lost his job if he could not take classes at the university,199 so
in another sense, the order maintained the status quo. Several circuit courts have
adopted a preliminary injunction standard that holds a movant to a higher burden
if the requested injunction would disturb the status quo or is mandatory (requiring
action), as opposed to prohibitory (forbidding action).200 Although this standard
favors status-quo-preserving injunctions, it also acknowledges that preliminary
injunctions will not always preserve the status quo.
Some courts have attempted to evade the potentially harmful nature of the
status quo by defining it as “the last peaceable, noncontested status of the
parties.”201 But in a number of cases—think of Gavin Grimm trying to use the boys’
room or Walter Camenisch seeking an interpreter—there is no “peaceable,
noncontested” state of affairs to which the parties can revert. And even if a court
leaves a relatively peaceable current state of affairs unchanged, “a court interferes
just as much when it orders the status quo preserved as when it changes it.”202
192. See WILLIAM WILLIAMSON KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INJUNCTIONS IN EQUITY 11–12 (1871) (“The effect and object of the interlocutory injunction is merely
to preserve the property in dispute in statu quo until the hearing or further order.”); Lee, supra note 49,
at 124–38.
193. See Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1945 (2018) (quoting Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390).
194. See Lee, supra note 49, at 140–43 (discussing “mandatory” injunctions that altered the status
quo in Nineteenth Century America); Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 546.
195. See James T. Carney, Rule 65 and Judicial Abuse of Power: A Modest Proposal for Reform,
19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 87, 88–89 (1995); Lee, supra note 49, at 163.
196. Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1974).
197. See, e.g., Aziz v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724 (E.D. Va. 2017).
198. Camenisch v. Univ. of Tex., No. A-78-CA-061, 1978 WL 51 (W.D. Tex. May 17, 1978),
vacated in part sub nom., Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390; Camenisch v. Univ. of Tex., 616 F.2d 127, 129 (5th
Cir. 1980), vacated in part sub nom., Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390.
199. Camenisch, 1978 WL 51, at *2 (noting “the state requirement that Plaintiff obtain his
Master’s degree, and the potential irreparable injury resulting from Plaintiff’s loss of employment”).
200. Lee, supra note 49, at 115–21.
201. Opticians Ass’n of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 197 (3d Cir. 1990)
(quoting 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30:19 (2d ed. 1984));
see also Developments in the Law—Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1058 (1965).
202. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 546.
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Preventing an important change can be a large imposition. And while a preliminary
injunction is not permanent, it can be in place for years while a lawsuit is pending.
In patent infringement cases, defendants have noted that while a final order
requiring them to obtain a license before producing a product would be a blow, an
interim prohibition on production is much worse.203 The notion that the stakes are
somehow lower because a preliminary injunction classically preserves the status quo
is off base.
Relatedly, in contrast to some courts’ suggestion that the preliminary
injunction is merely an interim remedy, the decision on the preliminary injunction
motion can have significant downstream consequences.204 While judges may, of
course, change their conclusions after a trial on the merits—findings on a
preliminary injunction motion are indeed preliminary—the suggestion that
preliminary injunction determinations are categorically less important or
consequential than trial findings is unjustified.205
Preliminary injunction decisions may effectively resolve a case—particularly
when timing is key to the parties’ interests. For example, if an employer seeks to
enjoin a former employee from going to a competitor and divulging a trade secret,
the preliminary injunction decision may render further proceedings moot. If the
injunction is denied, the trade secret will be divulged, so a permanent injunction
would be useless; if the preliminary injunction is granted, the protected information
may well lose its value before a trial on the merits, so the defendant’s interest in the
information will be lost.206 In Gavin Grimm’s case, the Supreme Court stayed the
preliminary injunction issued in his favor,207 vacating and remanding only after most
of his senior year had passed.208 Grimm graduated without ever being permitted to
use the boys’ bathroom.209 And consider labor injunctions—an historically
significant breed of injunction that is less prominent today, thanks to New Deal

203. Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions, 44
J.L. & ECON. 573, 574 (2001) (quoting the CEO of Napster).
204. See id. at 573 (“[P]ractitioner accounts suggest that injunctions have substantial effects on
the outcome of disputes.”).
205. See FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 178, at 78–80 (noting that while, in the labor
dispute context, courts have granted preliminary injunctions while doubtful about the facts because the
injunction “does not pass finally on the merits,” that “rationale must be rejected” because “the
preliminary injunction in the main determines and terminates the controversy in court”).
206. See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995) (describing the
relevant trade secret as “extensive and intimate knowledge about PCNA’s strategic goals for 1995 in
sports drinks and new age drinks”).
207. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, No. 16A52, 136 S. Ct. 2442, 2442
(2016) (mem.).
208. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, No. 16-273, 137 S. Ct. 1239, 1239
(2017) (mem.).
209. His suit continues, seeking nominal damages and a declaratory judgment. See Matt Stevens,
Transgender Student in Bathroom Dispute Wins Court Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/us/gavin-grimm-transgender-bathrooms.html [ https://perma.cc/
K9SV-6KCF ].
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legislation protecting the right to strike.210 Because strikes are so time sensitive,211 a
preliminary injunction enjoining a strike may spur the workers to abort their efforts
entirely.212 As Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene put it, “it is undeniably the fact
that the preliminary injunction in the main determines and terminates the
controversy in court.”213
Even if a preliminary injunction decision does not end a case, it may heavily
influence the judge’s ultimate ruling on the case.214 Kevin Lynch has addressed how
the psychological “lock-in effect” applies to preliminary injunction
determinations.215 Psychological research has shown that decisionmakers “lock in”
to an initial decision and are reluctant to change their decision when asked to revisit
it.216 This effect is particularly strong when a judge’s decision allows irreparable
harm to occur: the judge will then face both “internal and external pressures to
justify the harm,” and will be less likely to alter his decision later.217 Therefore, when
a judge grants or denies a preliminary injunction based on the likelihood of success
on the merits and irreparable harm occurs, the judge may be highly unlikely to
change his view of the merits.218
In addition, settlement negotiations occur in the shadow of a preliminary
injunction decision.219 The decision severely alters the bargaining positions of the
210. See Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 101–115 (2012)) (prohibiting preliminary injunctions in labor cases, except as permitted by
law); National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (1994)). Employers do still move to enjoin strikes today, particularly in the
transportation industry, thanks to the Railway Labor Act of 1926, ch. 1120, 64 Stat. 1238. See, e.g.,
A.B.X. Air, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 1:16-cv-1096, 2016 WL 7117388 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 7,
2016); Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. Division/IBT v. B.N.S.F. Ry., Inc., 134 F. Supp. 3d 1208
(C.D. Cal. 2015).
211. See Ruben J. Garcia, Labor’s Fragile Freedom of Association Post-9/11, 8 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 283, 327 (2006) (“The timing of a strike at the most inopportune time for the employer is a
major source of the economic leverage the union gains in striking.”); Jon R. Kerian, Injunctions in Labor
Disputes: The History of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 37 N.D. L. REV. 49, 51 (1961) (“[S]trikes are usually
won or lost within a few days . . . .”).
212. See Kerian, supra note 211, at 52 (“Once the injunction was granted, the strikers’ ferv[o]r
was abated and the strike was lost.”); Luke P. Norris, Labor and the Origins of Civil Procedure, 92
N.Y.U. L. REV. 462, 489 (2017).
213. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 178, at 80.
214. See Kenneth R. Berman, Litigating Preliminary Injunctions: Sudden Injustice on a Half-Baked
Record, 15 PRAC. LITIGATOR 31, 33 (2004) (“As a practical matter, the decision on the preliminary
injunction motion is often case dispositive.”).
215. See Kevin J. Lynch, The Lock-In Effect of Preliminary Injunctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 779 (2014).
216. Id. at 781.
217. Id.
218. Lynch focuses on denial of preliminary injunction. However, because granting a
preliminary injunction may also allow irreparable harm to occur, as discussed infra Section II.C.2., his
reasoning could also apply to decisions in which a judge grants the remedy and permits harm. Lynch
also suggests that the standard for “likelihood of success” on the merits is functionally the same as the
ultimate burden of proof. Lynch, supra note 215, at 798. I disagree with this in the next section.
219. But see Geoffrey P. Miller, Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 165, 195 (2010)
(suggesting preliminary injunction decisions give too weak a signal as to likelihood of success on
the merits).
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parties, and parties often settle after a preliminary injunction decision.220 The
preliminary injunction, then, is the final ruling the parties receive from the judge,
and it in effect resolves the dispute.
Courts have sometimes recognized—and sometimes declined to
acknowledge—the potential effective finality of preliminary injunction
determinations. Some judges, like Jerome Frank, have emphasized that “a
preliminary injunction—as indicated by the numerous more or less synonymous
adjectives used to label it—is, by its very nature, interlocutory, tentative, provisional,
ad interim, impermanent, mutable, not fixed or final or conclusive, characterized
by its for-the-time-beingness.”221 Others have acknowledged that “a preliminary
injunction is somewhat like a judgment and execution before trial.”222 In the Ninth
Circuit, parties looking to seal documents have to make a lesser showing “when
those materials are used in connection with a non-dispositive motion.”223 While
acknowledging that preliminary injunction motions are technically non-dispositive,
that court has deemed them “dispositive” for this purpose in part because they “go
to the heart of the case,”224 “may even, as a practical matter, determine the outcome
of a case,”225 and “are so significant, they are one of the few categories of motions
that may be heard as interlocutory appeals.”226
Both perspectives are, in a way, correct. Findings made for purposes of a
preliminary injunction order are subject to change—the order is not a final
judgment on the merits—but the decision can have enormous consequences both
in the long term and the short term. The importance of the preliminary injunction
motion suggests that courts should, at the very least, take evidentiary issues seriously
at this stage.227

220. See Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 60 (1993)
(“Chancellor Allen said to me that almost none of his cases get to final judgment—that he grants or
denies the preliminary injunction and then the case settles.”); Douglas Lichtman, Uncertainty and the
Standard for Preliminary Relief, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 197, 202 n.14 (2003) (noting that preliminary hearings
inform parties of how the judge is thinking about the case); Julie S. Turner, Comment, The
Nonmanufacturing Patent Owner: Toward a Theory of Efficient Infringement, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 179, 205
(1998) (noting, in the patent context, “[t]he grant or denial of a preliminary injunction has a very
powerful impact on settlement”); cf. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 547 (“More detailed analysis at the
interlocutory stage . . . would also provide the parties with a prediction of the final outcome that could
ease settlement.”).
221. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1953).
222. Herman v. Dixon, 141 A.2d 576, 577 (Pa. 1958) (opinion of Justice Herbert Cohen).
223. Quest Integrity USA, L.L.C. v. A.Hak Indus. Servs. US, L.L.C., No. C14-1971RAJ, 2015
WL 4495283, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 23, 2015).
224. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., L.L.C., 809 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2016).
225. Id. at 1099.
226. Id.
227. Cf. Mullenix, supra note 153, at 632 (“Once the serious consequences of class certification
are embraced, it follows that all actors involved should be required to produce and secure as reliable a
record as necessary to ensure that a court has appropriate information upon which to make a serious
class certification decision.”).

First to Printer_Wittlin.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

6/5/20 9:09 PM

META-EVIDENCE AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS

1363

2. Equity Under Pressure
Courts have also reasoned that the need to prevent irreparable harm under
tight time constraints justifies a lax evidentiary regime. In Camenisch, the Supreme
Court cited “the haste that is often necessary”228 on preliminary injunction motions
as a reason for informality. Wright and Miller similarly say Rule 56(c)(4) constraints
should not apply to affidavits on preliminary injunctions because “the urgency that
necessitates a prompt determination of the preliminary-injunction application may
make it more difficult to obtain affidavits from people who are competent to testify
at trial.”229 And because the decision to grant a preliminary injunction is
discretionary, “the trial court should be allowed to give even inadmissible evidence
some weight . . . in order to serve the primary purpose of preventing irreparable
harm before a trial can be had.”230 The Ninth Circuit has justified the use of
affidavits by the need to avoid a full hearing and “give speedy relief from irreparable
injury,”231 a central purpose of preliminary injunctions.
The timing problem has two related parts: the inability of litigants to discover
the best evidence in a short timeframe,232 and the need for courts to spend less time
on the preliminary injunction hearing than they would on a full trial.233 The second
concern poses less of a problem. True, if the preliminary injunction is particularly
time sensitive, the parties will likely want a hearing that lasts hours, not days or
weeks. But permitting affidavits in lieu of live testimony, particularly on
uncontested issues, should suffice to limit the time of the hearing. If and when a
written statement would be more efficient than live testimony, the parties may
submit that sworn testimony in written form. The elimination of other Federal Rules
of Evidence will allow in more evidence, lengthening hearing time. Arguments on
evidentiary objections could, indeed, require significant time. But they should not
typically take up too much time: the FRE are designed to be applied quickly, in a trial
context.234 Applying the FRE could cost time in some cases, but it could save time
in others.
228. Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981).
229. 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 29, § 2949.
230. Id.; see also G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 726 (4th
Cir. 2016) (explaining that a laxer evidentiary regime “is warranted by the nature and purpose of
preliminary injunction proceedings to prevent irreparable harm before a full trial on the merits”).
231. Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith Kline & French Labs., 207 F.2d 190, 198 (9th Cir. 1953).
232. See Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The urgency of
obtaining a preliminary injunction necessitates a prompt determination and makes it difficult to obtain
affidavits from persons who would be competent to testify at trial.”).
233. See Mullins v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 2010) (“To hold otherwise would
be at odds with the summary nature of the remedy and would undermine the ability of courts to provide
timely provisional relief.”); Mullins v. City of New York, 634 F. Supp. 2d 373, 387–88 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(“Through affidavits and hearsay testimony, a court may maximize the breadth of evidence without
necessitating hearings that span days or weeks. . . . In the instant case, the Court received the benefit
of evidence of concern expressed by dozens of individually-named sergeants without the burden of a
parade of witnesses and the loss of time by busy law enforcement officers.”).
234. See Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IOWA
L. REV. 413, 414 (1989).
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The first concern is more troubling: litigants may not be able to discover all
relevant evidence in a short timeframe, so even if admissible, discoverable, and
favorable evidence exists, they may be unable to present it. If courts are unable to
consider inadmissible evidence, then they will have insufficient information. And
this dearth of probative evidence increases the risk of error, so courts are more likely
to cause or allow irreparable harm. This undermines the central purpose of the
preliminary injunction: preventing irreparable harm pending a full trial on
the merits.
This is a real problem, and I discuss the precise way in which it is a real
problem in the next Part. However, in this Section, I discuss why it’s not as serious
a problem as some courts have suggested. First, if courts were to apply the Federal
Rules at this stage, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43 would allow judges to admit
affidavits and deposition transcripts, which would give the court significant
flexibility. Second, and more interestingly, by understanding that evidence
submitted to prove likelihood of success on the merits is “meta-evidence” and need
not be introduced to prove the merits directly, we can see that much evidence
thought of as inadmissible is actually admissible.
a. Affidavits Admissible
First, affidavits would be allowed. FRCP 43(c) explicitly permits a judge to
hear a motion on affidavits, live testimony, or deposition transcripts when that
motion relies on information outside the record. Preliminary injunction motions fit
the bill. This effectively creates a Rule-based exception to the rule against
hearsay: affidavits may be considered on a motion, even though the declarant is not
present nor subject to cross-examination. The use of affidavits allows parties to
focus their prehearing investigation time searching for evidence that can’t be
presented in affidavit form.
Even this single relaxation of the FRE to allow affidavits is somewhat
troubling. Affiants cannot be cross-examined, so courts are deprived of the
“‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,’”235 and deciding a
motion based on affidavits alone may be inadequate.236 However, most courts will
hold a live hearing if facts are contested.237 Many courts require a live hearing at a

235. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367
(3d ed. 1940)).
236. See 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 263 ( J.S. Mill ed., 1827)
(“As a mode of coming at the truth of the case, where the extraction of the truth is attended with any
considerable difficulty, nothing can be more palpably incompetent than the use of [affidavits] . . . .”).
237. See Davis v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 166 F.3d 432, 437–38 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[W]hile affidavits
may be considered on a preliminary injunction motion, motions for preliminary injunction should not
be resolved on the basis of affidavits that evince disputed issues of fact.”); 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 29, § 2949 nn.29–48 and accompanying text (discussing the practice in different courts under
various circumstances).
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party’s request if the parties dispute the facts.238 If the parties would prefer to resolve
the motion on a “battle of affidavits,” some courts will allow it.239 In sum, courts
seem to take heed of Judge Friendly’s wisdom in SEC v. Frank,240 in which he
advocated for tailoring the thoroughness of the preliminary injunction proceeding
to the centrality of the factual disputes: “[W]here everything turns on what
happened and that is in sharp dispute . . . , the inappropriateness of proceeding on
affidavits attains its maximum . . . .”241 Courts will consider affidavits, but when the
facts are in dispute, they will allow the parties to present additional testimony and
challenge each other’s evidence at a live hearing. This does not eliminate the concern
with affidavits—courts may still consider this “uninterrogated testimony”242—but
it at least mitigates the problem by allowing some interrogation of the other
party’s evidence.
b. Meta-Evidence
The second reason adhering to the FRE would not be as draconian as courts
have suggested is that much supposedly inadmissible evidence is actually admissible
under those Rules. To see why, we need to understand what that evidence actually
tends to prove: evidence introduced to prove likelihood of success of the merits is
not direct evidence of the merits—rather, it is proof of what evidence will be
introduced at trial. I call this evidence of what is to come “meta-evidence.” This
Subsection explains how the meta-evidence idea negates many evidentiary
objections at the preliminary injunction stage. It then discusses meta-evidence as a
lens through which we can view a number of procedural motions.
i. Meta-Evidence and Likelihood of Success
Although the preliminary injunction standard has four factors, it breaks down
neatly into two categories: the “likelihood of success on the merits” factor and the
harm factors—irreparable harm absent an injunction, balance of equities, and
public interest.
What does a plaintiff need to show to demonstrate likelihood of success? He
does not need to preliminarily demonstrate that he should win on the merits, were
the court to make a decision on the evidence presented now. Rather, he is tasked
with demonstrating that when there is a trial later on, he will likely win at trial. This
understanding accords with every theoretical discussion of the preliminary

238. See Cobell v. Norton, 391 F.3d 251, 261 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“Particularly when a court must
make credibility determinations to resolve key factual disputes in favor of the moving party, it is an
abuse of discretion for the court to settle the question on the basis of documents alone, without an
evidentiary hearing.”); 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 29, § 2949 n.43 (citing cases).
239. See Holt v. Cont’l Grp., Inc., 708 F.2d 87, 90 n.2 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Normally a party that
elects to gamble on a ‘battle of affidavits’ must live by that choice.”).
240. SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
241. Id. at 491.
242. 2 BENTHAM, supra note 236, at 262.
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injunction standard. The “likelihood of success” factor involves “predicting the
strength of the plaintiff’s case”243 and “apprais[ing] the likelihood that various views
of the facts and the law will prevail at trial.”244 As Douglas Laycock notes, the
relevant issue is “the probability that the preliminary relief to be granted will be a
part of the relief to be awarded at final judgment, or at least not inconsistent with
the rights to be determined by the final judgment.”245 In addition, a focus on
likelihood of success at trial provides the parties with the most useful information
for purposes of settlement negotiation.246 In practice, courts deciding preliminary
injunction motions often simply recite a litany of factual findings without couching
them in terms of what the parties can likely prove at trial.247 That practice clashes
with the “likelihood of success” standard.
For purposes of evidence, this distinction between assessing the claim on the
evidence presented and predicting the strength of the case at trial is an important
one: each piece of evidence is not being introduced to prove the merits; instead it is
being introduced to prove that the plaintiff will be able to succeed at a future trial.
In Michael Pardo’s words, the immediate goal is not “material accuracy,” or
determining “what actually happened,” but rather “procedural accuracy,” or aligning
the outcome with what would happen at trial.248 In this way, the evidence introduced
on a preliminary injunction hearing is “meta-evidence,” or evidence of what
evidence will be presented at trial. This is somewhat distinct from the idea of a trial
“preview,”249 in that meta-evidence does not necessarily reveal what will happen at
trial, but rather it provides probative evidence of what will happen at trial. That
evidence may be weaker or stronger, and it may point to a single possibility or
multiple possibilities. Evidence that goes to prove the harm factors, by contrast, is
not meta-evidence: when it issues a decision on a preliminary injunction motion, the
court makes an actual determination of likelihood of harm; it does not determine

243. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 533 (discussing historical practice at Chancery).
244. Id. at 541 (setting out the proper standard); see also id. at 555 (“Although the court cannot
know at the preliminary hearing what evidence the parties will present at trial, it can estimate the
probability of different findings of fact by using affidavits, representations of counsel, inferences from
the failure to produce accessible evidence, and the judge’s own notions about the plausibility of the
parties’ contentions.”).
245. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 120 (1991).
Laycock distinguishes this from “the probability that plaintiff will prevail on some issue of ultimate
liability.” Id. But the likelihood that plaintiff will prevail is inherently a part of the likelihood that he will
obtain the same relief permanently.
246. Cf. Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1961, 2015 (2007) (suggesting trial judges get involved in settlement discussions so as to
communicate tentative merits evaluations); Miller, supra note 219, at 195.
247. See, e.g., Smith v. Aroostook Cty., 376 F. Supp. 3d 146, 149-54 (D. Me. 2019). Courts are
required to make findings of fact, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(2), but I see no reason these cannot be
framed in terms of what the parties are likely to be able to prove.
248. See Michael S. Pardo, Pleadings, Proof, and Judgment: A Unified Theory of Civil Litigation,
51 B.C. L. REV. 1451, 1470–71 (2010).
249. See Bert I. Huang, Trial by Preview, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1332 (2013).
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how likely it is that the plaintiff will be able to prove likelihood of harm absent a
preliminary injunction at some later date.
The FRE exclude certain types of evidence when used for an improper purpose.
For example, an out-of-court statement is inadmissible hearsay only if it is offered
“to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”250 When evaluating
whether some piece of evidence is inadmissible hearsay, then, a judge needs to ask,
“Is this evidence being offered for the truth of the matter asserted?” If we
understand that evidence as being used to prove a likelihood of success, that affects
our determination of whether it is being admitted for the truth of the matter
asserted: if evidence that somebody said something once is admitted to prove that
they will say it in admissible form at trial, that evidence is not being used for the
truth of the matter. Therefore, it is not hearsay, and it is admissible under the FRE.
For example,251 say we have a trademark dispute between one pharmaceutical
company that makes a drug called Flexxor and another that makes a drug called
Lexxor. To prove likelihood of success on the merits—to show Flexxor will be able
to prove people confuse the drugs—a manager at the Flexxor company submits an
affidavit saying that five of his salespeople have told him that doctors have called
them to ask how much Lexxor costs. Are these statements within the affidavit
hearsay? I submit that they are not: The affidavit is not being introduced to show
that doctors have in fact called Flexxor salespeople asking for the price of Lexxor.252
Instead, it is being introduced to prove that there are five salespeople in the
plaintiff’s employ who could come to court and testify that they received these calls.
At that point, they would be cross-examined, and the factfinder could choose
whether to credit their testimony. This is not as powerful meta-evidence as a
transcript from a previous proceeding or live testimony would be. A transcript
would be strong proof that the declarant is willing and able to testify in court. And
if the salespeople testified live, the judge would be much more certain that they
would testify to the confusion at trial, and she could perform a preliminary
credibility determination. But the affidavit is still probative of what would happen
at trial.
This does not mean that no statements offered to show likelihood of success
are hearsay. Say that instead of the affidavit above, the manager submitted an
affidavit saying, “My friend, the late, great Dr. Cautious,253 told me that on multiple
occasions, he started to write a prescription for Lexxor, and halfway through
realized he actually meant to prescribe Flexxor.” Dr. Cautious is deceased and
therefore unable to testify. This affidavit, then, is not admissible meta-evidence. It
is still probative of Flexxor’s ability to prove its case at trial. However, it is probative
only if Dr. Cautious’s statement is offered for the truth. The chain of inference is
250. FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2).
251. This hypothetical is loosely based on the facts of Kos Pharmaceuticals.
252. The doctors’ question—“How much does Lexxor cost?”—is also not hearsay, as it is not
an assertion, express or implied.
253. Ironically, Dr. Cautious died B.A.S.E. jumping.
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(1) Dr. Cautious said he mixed up the drugs on multiple occasions; (2) therefore, he
did in fact mix up the drugs; (3) therefore, the drugs are easily confused; and
(4) therefore, there are likely other doctors who will testify to mixing up the drugs.
In this case, because the court needs to accept the truth of the out-of-court
statement to find it relevant to the ultimate issue—what evidence will be presented
at trial—it is hearsay and inadmissible.
If the court were faced with true hearsay that is absolutely necessary to do
justice, the court would still have discretion to accept it under Rule 807, the residual
exception to the rule against hearsay. One of the requirements of Rule 807 is that
the evidence be “more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts.”254 “Reasonable
efforts” here could be interpreted as efforts reasonable in the preliminary injunction
context, given time and resource constraints. The hearsay catchall may, then, have
wider arms at preliminary injunction hearings than it does at trial.
This reasoning, showing that statements within affidavits are often
non-hearsay and therefore admissible, does require courts to accept affidavits
themselves as non-hearsay for purposes of a preliminary injunction motion. James
Duane has previously made a point very similar to my meta-evidence idea in an
argument that affidavits considered on a motion for summary judgment are not
hearsay.255 He argues that these affidavits are not introduced for the truth of the
statements within them but rather as evidence that the affiant will testify to those
statements at trial.256 Therefore, Rule 56 is not an exception to the rule against
hearsay—affidavits introduced in that context are simply non-hearsay.257 At the
preliminary injunction stage, I rely on Rule 43(c)—and the longstanding practice of
accepting affidavits—for the proposition that affidavits are admissible, at the
judge’s discretion, on a preliminary injunction motion. The advisory committee
notes to FRE 802, the rule against hearsay, specifically identify affidavits admitted
under Rule 43 as an exception to the rule. I therefore take affidavits made on
personal knowledge to be the equivalent of in-court testimony. Statements within
affidavits, however, may still be inadmissible hearsay.258

254. FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(2).
255. See Duane, supra note 26, at 1531–44 (arguing that affidavits submitted in support of or in
opposition to a Rule 56 motion are non-hearsay).
256. See id.
257. The advisory committee notes to FRE 802 indicate that Rule 56 is an exception. I agree
with Duane, but I note that evidence supporting a preliminary injunction motion is even more clearly
meta-evidence than evidence supporting a motion for summary judgment: In its order on a preliminary
injunction motion, a court actually makes findings as to the likelihood of success on the merits. On a
motion for summary judgment, the court does not make findings, but rather draws all reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the non-moving party, for purposes of resolving the motion.
McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 202 (2d Cir. 2007). Evidence, then, plays a slightly
different role in the summary judgment context than it does at trial, whereas
meta-evidence on a preliminary injunction motion operates as evidence normally does: it may be more
or less probative on a point of fact.
258. In the summary judgment context, Duane calls the idea that a court may consider hearsay
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Understanding likelihood-of-success evidence as meta-evidence has the
greatest impact on hearsay analysis. But it may also help illuminate how a court
could hear expert evidence that would not be allowed at trial. Rule 702, and therefore
Daubert, applies whenever an expert testifies to his or her opinion, independent of
what that opinion is used for.259 However, this does not necessarily mean that every
case requiring an expert will require the expert to produce final conclusions that meet
the Daubert standard at the preliminary injunction. An expert can testify to
intermediate conclusions or the methodology that they would use, if they were to
testify at trial. For example, researchers often run pilot studies to determine if a full
study with the same methodology is feasible and whether the study is worth
pursuing.260 If a researcher would need to run a complete study to present as an
expert witness at trial, and if the pilot study is considered a reliable method of
forming an opinion that a full study is feasible, a researcher could introduce the pilot
study at the preliminary injunction stage as meta-evidence.261 As long as this
testimony itself is reliable, it would satisfy Daubert and be sufficiently probative for
use at the preliminary injunction hearing.
The categorical exclusion Rules—Rules 404 through 411—would generally
apply with full force at the preliminary injunction stage. For example, evidence of a
person’s character trait is inadmissible to prove that the person acted in accordance
with that character in a particular instance.262 Say we have a copyright case, where

in the form of affidavits but not hearsay within affidavits “senseless.” Duane, supra note 26, at 1529. He
argues that the difference in reliability between hearsay and “multiple hearsay” is, at best, a difference
“only in degree of reliability, not in kind,” and multiple hearsay may well be more reliable than simple
hearsay. Id. at 1529–30. It is true, of course, that affidavits are not subject to cross-examination and are
therefore less reliable than in-court testimony. However, they are made under penalty of perjury—one
safeguard of live testimony against insincerity—and they are written down, lowering the chances of a
remark being misleading simply because it is ill-phrased. Hearsay within the affidavit still has these
attendant dangers.
In addition, Duane argues, the FRE do not otherwise differentiate between hearsay and multiple
hearsay. Id. at 1530. There, I disagree: the advisory committee notes on Rule 802 list multiple exceptions
to the rule against hearsay from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 43 motions based on material
outside the record, yes, but also affidavits used to secure a temporary restraining order and depositions
used at trial. FED R. EVID. 802; FED R. CIV. P. 43. The Rules contemplate that affidavits and
depositions, admitted for the truth of their contents, are sufficiently reliable for some circumstances. I
disagree with Duane, then, that this distinction is incoherent. However, I agree with him that for
purposes of a motion for summary judgment, an affidavit that satisfies the Rule 56 requirements is not,
in fact, hearsay.
259. FED. R. EVID. 702 (referring to when a “witness who is qualified as an expert . . .
may testify”).
260. See Edwin R. van Teijlingen & Vanora Hundley, The Importance of Pilot Studies, SOC. RES.
UPDATE, Winter 2001, at 2 tbl.1, 4 (2001), http://sru.soc.surrey.ac.uk/SRU35.pdf [ https://perma.cc/
A4LK-7VRD ] (“Well-designed and well-conducted pilot studies can inform us about the best research
process and occasionally about likely outcomes.”).
261. Cf. Hon. Daniel P. Ryan, The Use of Gilles De La Tourette’s Syndrome as an Impulse Control
Defense in Criminal Cases: A Comprehensive Review, 14 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 375, 424 (2010)
(“[A] pilot study may be performed with scientifically reliable methods but because it is a pilot study a
judge may not consider it ‘reliable’ from an evidentiary perspective.”).
262. See FED. R. EVID. 404.

First to Printer_Wittlin.docx (Do Not Delete)

1370

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

6/5/20 9:09 PM

[Vol. 10:1331

the plaintiff must prove that the defendant copied original elements of the plaintiff’s
work.263 On a preliminary injunction motion, the plaintiff wants to introduce
evidence that the defendant has copied works in the past to show a propensity for
copying.264 How would this show likelihood of success on the merits? This evidence
itself would not be admissible at trial, under the character evidence prohibition. It
could also show likelihood of success on the merits through the following chain of
inference: (1) the defendant has a propensity for copying; (2) therefore, he copied
on this occasion; (3) therefore, the plaintiff is likely to unearth evidence of copying
during discovery; and (4) therefore, the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits.
However, this chain of reasoning also invokes the forbidden character inference: the
defendant has a propensity for copying so he copied on this occasion. This use of
character evidence is forbidden, and the court should not consider the evidence.
For similar reasons, the other categorical-exclusion rules—those excluding
evidence of subsequent remedial measures,265 settlement offers,266 and offers to pay
medical expenses,267 among others—would apply to exclude likelihood-of-success
evidence. But these sorts of rules—rules that primarily serve the purpose of creating
an incentive for certain out-of-court behavior268—should apply at the preliminary
injunction stage. If admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures, settlement
offers,269 or offers to pay medical expenses at trial disincentivizes those behaviors,
admitting the evidence during preliminary injunction hearings should have the same
effect. These rules would operate to exclude evidence, even meta-evidence,
introduced to prove likelihood of success on the merits.
Some courts have come close to articulating the meta-evidence idea. For
example, in Bebe Stores, Inc. v. May Department Stores International, Inc., the district
court addressed a hearsay objection to affidavits by noting that the affidavits could

263. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
264. Cf. Loggerhead Tools, L.L.C. v. Sears Holdings Corp., No. 12 C 9033, 2017 WL 4161976,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2017).
265. See FED. R. EVID. 407. Evidence of subsequent remedial measures used to prove a defect
is unlikely to arise in a preliminary injunction proceeding. If the product has already been remedied,
there is no urgent need for an injunction.
266. See FED. R. EVID. 408.
267. See FED. R. EVID. 409.
268. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee’s note on proposed rules. For a criticism of this
rationale, see Dan M. Kahan, The Economics—Conventional, Behavioral, and Political—of “Subsequent
Remedial Measures” Evidence, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1616 (2010).
269. The logic is more complicated than for the other exclusionary rules. Federal Rule of
Evidence 408 forbids using statements made during settlement negotiations to prove the “validity” of
a disputed “claim.” A statement made during settlement negotiations could be introduced to prove that
the person would make the same statement if called to the stand, which seems not to violate Rule 408.
However, first, even if this were permissible, the evidence would be weak; during settlement
negotiations, parties choose their words strategically, and may well speak differently on the stand.
Second, and more importantly, the broad language of Rule 408 should be interpreted to further its aims.
See 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 135, § 4:57. Proving the need for a preliminary injunction
or proving likelihood of success could both be construed as proving the “validity” of the “claim.” This
evidence should be excluded.
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come in under Rule 807, and having “sworn statements of thirty-five more
[witnesses]—who certainly can all be called live or by deposition when we ultimately
have trial on the merits—is probative on the issue of whether bebe is likely to
succeed on the issue of confusion.”270 Others have suggested that the hearsay status
of evidence presented at a preliminary injunction hearing renders it inadmissible or
goes to its weight not because the evidence is less reliable but rather because it will
not be admissible at trial.271 And courts have correctly suggested that the likelihood
of success should also be tied to the completeness of the evidence: if discovery is
complete before the hearing, the likelihood of success is directly related to the
admissible evidence the plaintiff can present at that hearing.272 If the hearing
happens without much opportunity for discovery, much weaker evidence may show
a likelihood of success. But courts have not taken the idea to its logical conclusion
concerning hearsay and other rules, discussed above. And I have found no court
suggesting that the admissibility standard might look different for the different
elements of the preliminary injunction test.
ii. Meta-Evidence Generally
The meta-evidence concept is useful beyond the preliminary injunction
stage—at several points in a litigation, parties may be required to present some sort
of proof of what they will be able to demonstrate at trial. And at each of these
points, rules govern the meta-evidence that each party may present and the burden
each party faces. Meta-evidence provides a helpful new way of conceptualizing what
happens at each juncture. For purposes of this theoretical discussion, I use
“evidence” in a broad sense: I include not only proof admitted as evidence but rather
all factual material the parties present to a decisionmaker.
One obvious point at which meta-evidence is introduced is on a motion for
summary judgment. The parties have typically engaged in extensive discovery at this
point, and they present a preview of what evidence will be available at trial.273
Therefore, the parties are held to a high meta-evidentiary standard and
burden—they must submit reliable, highly-probative proof of what evidence will be
presented at trial. Compliance with the Rule 56(c)(4) requirements provides strong
evidence that an affiant will, in fact, testify to the facts set out in the affidavit274: a
person who was willing to swear to facts in an affidavit is likely to swear to the same

270. 230 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 n.4 (E.D. Mo. 2002), aff’d in part, 313 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 2002).
271. See, e.g., Gluco Perfect, L.L.C. v. Perfect Gluco Prods., Inc., No. 14-CV-1678, 2014 WL
4966102, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2014) (“Moreover, this court has considered whether the exclusion at
trial of inadmissible hearsay evidence will affect plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits.”); Lawson
v. Parish of St. Tammany, No. CIV.A. 02-1223, 2002 WL 1837870, at *5 (E.D. La. Aug. 6, 2002).
272. See Rouser v. White, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1066 n.4 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“Where discovery
is complete as to actions occurring before April 3, 2009, plaintiff’s likelihood of success is closely tied
to the admissible evidence he can present at trial.”).
273. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Duane, supra note 26.
274. See Duane, supra note 26, at 1541–42.
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facts on the witness stand.275 All other evidence cited on a motion for summary
judgment must be presentable in admissible form;276 that evidence, too, is highly
probative of what will be presented at trial. Courts have generally held, therefore,
that hearsay within an affidavit cannot be considered on a motion for summary
judgment.277 As James Duane has pointed out, this means that no hearsay is
admissible on a motion for summary judgment: the affidavits—out-of-court
statements—are not being offered for their truth, but rather to demonstrate that the
affiant will testify to the facts stated in the affidavit.278
Meta-evidence considered on a motion for summary judgment is dispositive as
to the meta-evidence issue: What evidence will be presented at trial? In other words,
the court takes the evidence submitted on the motion for summary judgment and
asks itself, “If I assume that all of these witnesses . . . would testify at trial just as
they have in their affidavits, is there any way this case could survive a motion for
[judgment as a matter of law]?”279 For purposes of a summary judgment motion,
then, meta-evidence that satisfies Rule 56’s strict standards is not merely probative
of what evidence will be presented at trial—it’s conclusive.
The meta-evidence idea also presents a new way of understanding motions to
dismiss and a potential approach to evaluating the standard on a motion to dismiss.
A party’s allegations in a complaint are, in a sense, meta-evidence. By signing a
pleading, a party’s attorney certifies that “after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances,” to the best of their “knowledge, information, and belief,” “the
factual contentions [in the pleading] have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
further investigation or discovery.”280 This certification makes it more likely that
there will, in fact, be evidentiary support for the factual proposition. Rule 11 does
not explicitly require that the attorney believe that there will be admissible evidentiary
support for the fact, although at least one commentator has noted that “the use of
the words ‘evidence’ and ‘evidentiary support’ impart the notion of admissibility.”281

275. This is not conclusive evidence, of course. “[T]he affiant need not state a willingness to
submit to cross-examination at trial and thereby waive the ability to claim a privilege and refuse to give
testimony.” 10B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 29, § 2738.
276. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2).
277. See, e.g., Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322–24 (11th Cir. 1999); Garside v. Osco
Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990); Friedel v. City of Madison, 832 F.2d 965, 970–71 (7th
Cir. 1987); Miller v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1020, 1026 (8th Cir. 1984); 10B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 29,
§ 2738 n.15 (collecting cases). But see Gannon Int’l, Ltd. v. Blocker, 684 F.3d 785, 793 (8th Cir. 2012);
Ali v. Dist. Dir., 209 F. Supp. 3d 1268, 1276 (S.D. Fla. 2016). These courts, which allow hearsay if the
declarant could testify, essentially operate under a different meta-evidentiary regime.
278. See Duane, supra note 26, at 1535.
279. Id. at 1580.
280. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).
281. GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE § 1(A)(4),
at 28 (5th ed. 2013). Some courts have suggested as much. See Jackson v. Cronic, No. 2:11-CV-00058WCO, 2013 WL 12099477, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 23, 2013) (“As the record suggests that there was no
admissible evidence to support either of these claims, the court must necessarily conclude that plaintiff’s
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On a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff’s meta-evidentiary burden is low. The
court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the
complaint.”282 Another way of understanding this standard is that for purposes of
a motion to dismiss, the lawyer’s certification is dispositive meta-evidence: if a
lawyer certifies that after a reasonable inquiry, she has determined that there is or
will be evidence to support the well-pleaded factual contention, the court must
conclude from that evidence that the party will present evidence on that point. (The
court must also conclude that the factfinder will credit the evidence and find the
fact in the plaintiff’s favor.) At this stage—before any discovery, while the plaintiff
is asking for no more than that the case move forward—the party need not present
evidence beyond the lawyer’s certification.
Twombly283 and Iqbal284 can be understood as imposing a heightened
meta-evidentiary standard relative to what came before. Under those cases, a court
ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss first disregards any conclusory
allegations and then determines whether the well-pleaded allegations state a
plausible claim to relief.285 In other words, Twombly and Iqbal impose a rule of
weight, a rule that “guides the factfinder’s evaluation of the evidence by specifying
the probative value the factfinder ought to attach to a given piece of evidence.”286
If an allegation is non-conclusory, it has infinite meta-evidentiary probative value.
If it is conclusory, it has no probative value. The implication of this aspect of
Twombly and Iqbal is that when a lawyer certifies that they have or will likely have
evidence to support a more concrete and specific statement,287 that is sufficiently
probative for purposes of a motion to dismiss. When a lawyer certifies that they
have or will likely have evidence to support a legal conclusion, that is insufficiently
probative to be credited for purposes of that motion.
Although the purpose of the motion to dismiss is contested,288 one commonly
cited function, which the Supreme Court invoked in Twombly, is to filter out
unmeritorious cases and allow the cases that are more likely to ultimately succeed
to proceed to discovery.289 Reading Twombly and Iqbal (“Twiqbal”) through a metacounsel failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry to determine whether they had a legitimate basis in fact
before he advocated them before the court.”).
282. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002).
283. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
284. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
285. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680–81.
286. See Charles L. Barzun, Rules of Weight, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1957, 1958 (2008).
287. Adam Steinman suggests that non-conclusory allegations are those that identify “the
real-world acts or events underlying the plaintiff’s claim.” Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1334 (2010).
288. Compare Daniel A. Epstein, How Probable Is “Plausible”?, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 34,
39–45 (2018) (proposing a model of the motion to dismiss that minimizes error costs), with Christopher
M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 556 (2002) (arguing, pre-Twombly and Iqbal,
that “under the Federal Rules pleadings serve but a single function: providing notice”).
289. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559–60 (2007); Steinman, supra note 287, at
1347 (characterizing the purposes of pleading as “notice-giving, process-facilitating, and
merits-screening”).
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evidentiary lens suggests one way to partially reduce the effectiveness of its first step
to an empirical question: How probative is a conclusory statement at the pleading
stage, before the plaintiff has had the opportunity for discovery? When a lawyer
certifies that there is or is likely to be evidentiary support for a conclusory allegation,
how strongly does that, in fact, indicate that there will be evidentiary support for
the proposition at trial? If it is very weak—if plaintiffs who make conclusory
allegations only overwhelmingly come up empty-handed after discovery—perhaps
Twombly and Iqbal have it right. But if plaintiffs who make conclusory allegations do
tend to come up with admissible evidence during discovery—this seems particularly
likely in areas where defendants hold key evidence290—these cases may impose too
high a meta-evidentiary burden.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that judges should inquire into the likelihood
that a specific plaintiff will be able to produce evidence when ruling on a motion to
dismiss. Rather, I suggest that the meta-evidence concept lets us evaluate whether
Twiqbal draws a distinction that is likely to aid in separating meritorious cases from
unmeritorious cases at the motion to dismiss stage. An empirical study of this issue
may not be possible—Alex Reinert likely got as close as possible by studying
pre-Twiqbal cases, concluding that “thinly” pleaded cases were no less likely to result
in a plaintiff-favorable outcome than cases generally.291 But meta-evidence presents
one new way of conceptualizing the Twiqbal standard.
Third, and perhaps least interestingly, offers of proof are meta-evidence.
When a court sustains an evidentiary objection, the proponent of the evidence may
make an offer of proof, or “proffer.”292 The offer of proof informs the court of the
substance of the proposed evidence and the lawyer’s theory of admissibility.293 This
allows the court to reconsider its ruling and, more importantly, preserves the
objection for appellate review.294
Offers of proof are functionally dispositive meta-evidence for both the trial
court and the court of appeals: the judge determines admissibility based on the
substance of the evidence offered. However, a lawyer may make an offer of proof
in one of two basic ways, and these methods differ in their meta-evidentiary value.
Either counsel may summarize the evidence, orally or in writing, or counsel may

290. Cf. Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The Economics of Pleading and
Summary Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 39, 41 (2008) (concluding that “pleading
standards should vary with the evidentiary demands of the associated legal standards and the social
costs of litigation”).
291. See generally Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119 (2011);
see also Jonah B. Gelbach, Material Facts in the Debate over Twombly and Iqbal, 68 STAN. L. REV. 369,
374 n.8, 376 (2016) (concluding “empirics cannot conclusively resolve the case-quality aspects of
the Twiqbal debate” and criticizing Reinert’s study for coding settlements as plaintiff-favorable
outcomes).
292. See Lewis Kapner, Offers of Proof, 21 FAM. L.Q. 265, 268 (1987).
293. See 1 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 103.20 (2d ed. 1997).
294. See FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(2).

First to Printer_Wittlin.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

6/5/20 9:09 PM

META-EVIDENCE AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS

1375

produce actual witness testimony, live or by deposition.295 While the witness’s live
testimony out of the presence of the jury is very strong evidence of what the witness
would say, counsel may be mistaken, optimistic, or imprecise in their summary.296
Implicitly recognizing these concerns, Federal Rule 103(c) allows the court to direct
that the offer of proof be made in “question-and-answer form.”297 In this way, the
Federal Rules themselves provide a mechanism to achieve sufficiently reliable
meta-evidence—evidence of what evidence would be offered at trial—for both the
trial court and the reviewing court of appeals.
Meta-evidence may arise elsewhere in the law,298 but these three examples
suffice to show that the concept is not limited to the preliminary injunction context.
c. Other Elements of the Preliminary Injunction Standard
While the question for the first prong of the preliminary injunction test is
“what is the plaintiff likely to prove at trial?” the other prongs of the Winter test299
concern facts outside of the court context. What is the likely irreparable harm of
denying or granting a preliminary injunction? In what direction does the balance of
hardships lean? Is it in the public interest to grant or deny the preliminary
injunction? For these prongs, the Rules of Evidence would apply conventionally
(again, with the exception of affidavits). The “meta-evidence” idea is irrelevant.300
Wouldn’t this be too hard on plaintiffs, especially? Wouldn’t they have trouble
proving irreparable harm under such a short time frame, using only evidence
admissible under the FRE and affidavits?
As I discuss in the next Part, this concern is real. Plaintiffs may not have ready
access to admissible evidence showing irreparable harm. But again, applying the
295. See 1 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 293; Jason S. Lambert, The Perfect Proffer, 89
FLA. B.J. 38, 38–39 (2015).
296. See Kapner, supra note 292, at 269–70. Counsel might also be dishonest. See Comment, The
Offer of Proof in Grounding Exceptions, 31 YALE L.J. 542, 543 (1922).
297. FED. R. EVID. 103(c).
298. For example, meta-evidence can arise in discovery. In Zubulake v. U.B.S. Warburg, 216
F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), the defendants resisted producing emails stored on backup tapes—an
expensive process—and they argued that if they were required to produce the emails, the plaintiff
should pay for production. To determine whether the tapes were likely to contain relevant evidence not
available elsewhere, Judge Scheindlin directed the production of a sample of emails, and she used that
evidence as a sort of meta-evidence to analyze what evidence the other tapes might contain. See id. at
281–87. I thank John Leubsdorf for this example. And a sort of counterfactual meta-evidence may arise
in legal malpractice suits, where the plaintiff must show that he would have prevailed or achieved a
better result if not for his attorney’s deficient performance. See 4 RONALD E. MALLEN, LEGAL
MALPRACTICE § 33:29 (2020 ed. 2020). I thank Keith Sharfman for this example.
299. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008).
300. This is true for the irreparable harm prong but not the irreparable harm inquiry. Likelihood
of success on the merits includes the likelihood that the plaintiff will be granted a permanent injunction,
which requires a showing of irreparable harm absent the injunction. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). The plaintiff must submit meta-evidence showing that it will be able
to prove irreparable harm at a trial on the merits. But they will also have to submit evidence—not
meta-evidence—showing they will in fact be harmed if the preliminary injunction does not enter. I
therefore address irreparable harm outside the meta-evidence paradigm.
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FRE would not be as hard on movants as it sounds. Whereas plaintiffs likely do not
have access to all the evidence they need to prove probable success on the merits,
they’re more likely to have access to evidence that will show they themselves will be
harmed by denial of injunctive relief. And defendants, similarly, are more likely to
have evidence showing they will be harmed if injunctive relief is granted. It makes
sense to hold parties to a stricter evidentiary standard with regard to evidence that
is in their possession.301 Applying the FRE to the irreparable harm prong should
not exclude very much key affirmative evidence.
But what about Gavin Grimm—the transgender boy? Would he be unable to
show irreparable harm at the preliminary injunction stage under the FRE? No.
Grimm’s lawyers—likely recognizing that the plaintiff’s sworn statement
concerning his own diagnosis would be insufficient—retained a psychologist for
purposes of the lawsuit who filed her own declaration. That analyst opined, based
on her “clinical assessment” of G.G. and her expertise, that the school’s bathroom
policy “is currently . . . placing G.G. at risk for accruing lifelong psychological
harm.”302 The court’s decision not to credit her statements seems to be at least as
substantial a factor in Grimm’s loss at the district court as the court’s decision not
to consider hearsay. Applying the FRE should make little difference in this case:
while the judge here denied the preliminary injunction motion after excluding the
hearsay in Grimm’s affidavit, many other judges would consider the psychologist’s
declaration sufficiently probative of irreparable harm to Grimm.303
Would the new regime have excluded key evidence in Mullins v. City of New
York, the Second Circuit case that held courts may consider hearsay on preliminary
injunction motions? In that labor suit brought by police officers, the district court
enjoined the City of New York and the NYPD from investigating and disciplining
police officer plaintiffs based upon their participation in the lawsuit.304 The
plaintiffs argued that a preliminary injunction was necessary because plaintiffs who
were not protected would drop out of the lawsuit due to fear of retaliation. The
301. Cf. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 414, 433
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“Once plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence of irreparable harm, however,
defendants were obliged to produce evidence other than affidavits respecting the economic effects of
an injunction, particularly since such information is exclusively within their possession.”); Dale
A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227, 227 (1988) (“[M]y thesis is that there exists,
even today, a principle of evidence law that a party should present to the tribunal the best evidence
reasonably available on a litigated factual issue.”).
302. Expert Declaration of Randi Ettner, Ph.D at 2, 8, 9, G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester
Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736 (E.D. Va. 2015) (No. 4:15-cv-00054).
303. See, e.g., Hicklin v. Precynthe, No. 4:16-cv-01357, 2018 WL 806764, at *6, *9–10
(E.D. Mo. Feb. 9, 2018) (relying, in part, on Dr. Ettner’s clinical evaluation to grant a preliminary
injunction); Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1186–87 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (relying on a
declaration by Dr. Ettner written after one clinical evaluation); cf. Oakleaf v. Martinez, 297 F. Supp. 3d
1221, 1230 (D.N.M. 2018) (concluding, in part based on Dr. Ettner’s affidavit after two evaluations,
that plaintiff had a “sufficiently serious medical need,” but ultimately denying a preliminary injunction).
304. Mullins v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Mullins v. City of New
York, 634 F. Supp. 2d 373, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). This preliminary injunction differs from the usual sort
in that it enjoined pretrial activities, as opposed to preliminarily ordering the relief plaintiff sought.
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evidence included in-court statements and affidavits averring that other plaintiffs
had voiced concern about participating in the case absent an injunction. While the
district court judge’s finding of irreparable harm relied on testimony that named the
out-of-court declarants,305 the Second Circuit also noted an affidavit from one
officer stating that approximately five sergeants—unnamed—said they were
considering dropping out of the lawsuit for fear of reprisal.306 As the plaintiffs’
attorneys307 argued to the district court, this evidence was likely admissible under
Rule 803(3), the hearsay exception for statements of “the declarant’s then-existing
state of mind (such as motive, intent, or plan) or emotional . . . condition . . . .”308
These statements concerned the declarants’ fear309 and intent to withdraw from the
suit, so they likely fall under the exception. However, even if the court ruled that
the exception did not apply, each named officer could sign a short affidavit, which
would suffice for the preliminary injunction proceedings. As for officers who
remained unnamed in the declarations, if they were not willing to come forward,
their voices would go unheard. In one sense, this is a just result: granting an
injunction based on anonymous, unsworn, out-of-court statements is potentially
more troubling than excluding those statements. However, in unusual
circumstances similar to Mullins—where the preliminary injunction would protect
witnesses from retaliation—a court might need to take steps to protect anonymity,
pending resolution of the motion.
In a number of cases, then, applying the FRE would not unjustly exclude
evidence relevant to the “harm” factors. I discuss the cases where application of the
FRE would pose a problem in the next Part.
III. BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF APPLYING THE RULES
I have critiqued the policy rationales for declining to apply the Rules of
Evidence at the preliminary injunction stage, saying they offer insufficient
justification. But what are the arguments for applying the FRE? And are there good
reasons not to apply them? In this Part, I discuss the benefits and drawbacks of
applying the FRE at the preliminary stage.
A. Reasons for Preferring Rules, Generally
There are several reasons for preferring a system of rules—either the FRE,
specifically, or others—as opposed to a purely discretionary system.
First, rules increase predictability. To the extent courts maintain a wholly

305. Mullins, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 383 & n.70.
306. Mullins, 626 F.3d at 51; see Declaration of Edward Scott at 6, Mullins, 634 F. Supp. 2d 373
(No. 1:04-cv-02979), ECF No. 169.
307.
Plaintiffs were represented by attorneys at Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP, my
former employer. The case settled before I arrived at the firm, and I did not work on it.
308. See FED. R. EVID. 803(3).
309. Plaintiffs’ Bench Memorandum Concerning the City’s Hearsay Objection to Testimony to
Be Elicited at the Hearing at 2–3, Mullins, 634 F. Supp. 2d 373 (No. 1:04-cv-02979), ECF No. 165.
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discretionary regime with regard to which evidence they will credit and which they
will not, attorneys will be unable to predict reliably what evidence the court will
consider and what evidence the court will—perhaps sub silentio—disregard entirely.
While attorneys may try to produce the best possible evidence at the preliminary
injunction stage,310 if they are under time pressure, rules tell the attorneys which
evidence to prioritize in the days or weeks before the preliminary injunction hearing.
If they know what evidence the judge will consider, they know what to look for.
Imposition of rules would also tell parties how to argue their evidentiary objections.
Anecdotal evidence suggests many attorneys believe the FRE apply at the
preliminary injunction stage,311 despite court statements to the contrary, and those
attorneys may waste time on misguided arguments. Applying the FRE would bring
the law in line with their expectations. Rules tell the parties what evidence to search
for and how to argue for its exclusion.
Additionally, rules of evidence require judges to justify their decisions under
those rules. Forcing judges to give reasons for their decisions has at least two
benefits. First, it helps judges make better-thought-out evidentiary decisions. Giving
reasons for evidentiary decisions may serve as a check on those decisions,
particularly in a domain where error correction by an appellate court is unlikely.312
In the current regime, a court can note that the rules do not apply and state, “The
Court, therefore, in its discretion will consider all evidentiary submissions at this
stage, giving these submissions appropriate weight, without regard to whether these
evidentiary submissions” satisfy the requirements of Rule 56 or the FRE.313 In a
system with rules, the court might need to articulate why each challenged piece of
evidence satisfied the rules—it would be forced to think about whether and why
each piece of evidence merited consideration.

310. Tenth Circuit District Judge 2 Interview, supra note 117.
311. Id.
312. See Robin J. Effron, Reason Giving and Rule Making in Procedural Law, 65 ALA. L. REV. 683,
701–02 (2014); cf. Mullenix, supra note 153, at 611 (“[R]equiring judges to evaluate class certification
motions based on a true and reliable evidentiary record will enhance the judicial function, inducing
judges to make deliberative decisions in the shadow of possible appellate reversal for erroneous reliance
on inadmissible materials”). Judith Resnik has suggested that the creation of a public trial record, along
with the threat of appellate review, may compel judges to make sufficiently
well-supported decisions, explaining the low reversal rate. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
HARV. L. REV. 374, 408 n.137 (1982).
313. McGehee v. Hutchinson, No. 4:17-cv-00179, 2017 WL 1399554, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 15,
2017); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Lifewatch Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d 757, 762 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (“[T]he
court has assigned the appropriate weight to the evidence, including hearsay, and has considered only
the hearsay that bears sufficient indicia of reliability.”); Startrak Systems, L.L.C. v. Hester, No. 07-3203,
2007 WL 2705159, at *9 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2007) (“Given the nature of this proceeding, the court will
not strike the affidavit of Thomas Robinson. Instead, the court will exercise its discretion in
determining the weight given to each affiant in this matter.”); S. Foods Grp. L.P. v. Ben & Jerry’s
Homemade Inc., No. 98CV-54S, 1998 WL 718302, at *2 (D. Utah Aug. 24, 1998) (“While there are
portions of some of the affidavits that are conclusory or otherwise inappropriate to be considered as
evidence, the Court denies the motion to strike, and has given what it deems the appropriate weight to
the various evidentiary submissions of the parties.”).

First to Printer_Wittlin.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

6/5/20 9:09 PM

META-EVIDENCE AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS

1379

The FRE could limit judicial bias by compelling judges to exclude evidence
that helps the party they tend to favor, or vice versa.314 Without this reason-giving,
a judge would be able to credit even unreliable evidence given by a party she was
predisposed to favor. With reason-giving, confabulation is of course still possible,315
and judges could silently or subconsciously consider evidence they have rejected.
But there is at least potential for mitigation. “The judge who is required to enforce
the rules of evidence on herself is a judge who might in an ideal world be able to
function simultaneously as . . . archangel and prole.”316 And limiting discretion can
contribute to a perception of procedural fairness, which can make the work of the
courts appear more legitimate in the public’s eye.317
Second, reason-giving forces judges to clarify their thinking about the proper
role of each challenged piece of evidence.318 For example, in the travel ban case,
judges appeared to take Giuliani’s statement as direct evidence of President Trump’s
intent to keep Muslims out of the country.319 Had the statement been challenged
on hearsay grounds, the plaintiffs and the court would have been forced to articulate
why the evidence was relevant—it suggests a likelihood of success on the merits
because it presents a potential witness—which in turn would help the court
appreciate the probative value of the evidence. If a challenged piece of evidence has
one permissible use and one impermissible use, when a judge chooses to consider
it, she will articulate the permissible use and recognize the evidence as probative on
that point only. Relatedly, when a judge makes an evidentiary determination, she
may clarify how she understands the law—when she discussed why a piece of
evidence is probative, she can signal what the plaintiff has to prove. That
information will allow the parties to make stronger arguments down the road.
Finally, there is the possibility that the FRE actually do what they are designed
to do: enhance accuracy of decision-making by excluding evidence that factfinders

314. Cf. Norris, supra note 212, at 489 (recounting how judges used to refuse to hear oral
evidence from labor unions when employers moved for preliminary injunctions).
315. See Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative Law
Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483, 518–22 (2015) (arguing that because judges will use motivated
reasoning to construct post hoc justifications for preferred results, requiring reason-giving “may yield
insincerity and artificiality in judicial discourse, rather than promoting accountability
and transparency”).
316. Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165,
193 (2006).
317. See Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 767, 780
(2017); Effron, supra note 312, at 704; see also Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial
Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1368 (1985) (noting procedures promote
the public acceptability of verdicts). But see Cohen, supra note 315, at 514–17 (arguing that detailed
reason-giving can expose points of disagreement and cause legitimacy problems).
318. See Effron, supra note 312, at 714–15.
319. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 558 (D. Md. 2017).
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are likely to overvalue.320 Although the FRE have been widely321—and in some
cases quite persuasively322—criticized, we have, as a polity, determined that they
enhance accuracy.323 Frederick Schauer has argued, based on the general benefits
of having legal rules, “there appears to be more justification for a rule-based
approach to evidence than is accepted nowadays, and the idea of Free Proof may
have more cognitive and epistemic disadvantages than” some believe.324 To the
extent that the Rules of Evidence helpfully eliminate evidence that is likely to bias
factfinders, application of the FRE could have some salutary effect.
Application of the FRE may ultimately make little difference. Even though the
FRE do apply to bench trials, courts often apply them loosely in that context.325
This may be in part because judges think themselves more capable than jurors326
and in part because they recognize that they can’t “unhear” evidence whose
admissibility they’ve considered. And as Wistrich, Guthrie, and Rachlinski have
demonstrated, judges are sometimes unable to disregard inadmissible evidence.327
Further, appellate courts would be unlikely to reverse many decisions based on
evidentiary determinations.
However, requiring application of the FRE would discourage parties from
even attempting to introduce clearly inadmissible evidence, affording some
protection. Also, application of the FRE might put a thumb on the scale when
judges weigh evidence: even if they can’t unhear hearsay, by formally saying they
will not consider it, it may factor less into their decision.328 Unlike juries, who
typically issue general verdicts,329 judges issuing preliminary injunctions must state
their findings of fact.330 If the court has excluded the only piece of evidence
supporting a necessary finding, it will have a difficult time making that finding. And
certainly, making a Daubert determination could alter a judge’s perspective on that
320. See Richard D. Friedman, Minimizing the Jury Over-Valuation Concern, MICH. ST. L. REV. 967,
967–68 (2003) (noting that for hearsay, character, and expert evidence, “a large part of the reason usually
given for exclusion of evidence . . . is fear that the jury will overvalue the evidence”).
321. See Friedman, supra note 320. Cf. BENTHAM, supra note 236 (advocating free proof).
322. See, e.g., United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 2014) (discussing criticisms of
the present-sense impression and excited utterance exceptions to the rule against hearsay).
323. See ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 133 (2005) (“To be legitimate,
[adjudicators’] risk-allocating decisions ought to be justified by moral and political principles classifying
as authoritative. These principles ought to reflect societal preferences in the area of risk-allocation.
These general preferences need to be both adopted and adapted by the law of evidence.”).
324. Schauer, supra note 316, at 193–94.
325. Id. at 165–66, 195.
326. See James R. Dillon, Expertise on Trial, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 247 (2018).
327. See generally Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005).
328. In at least a couple of their studies, Wistrich, Guthrie, and Rachlinski found a sizeable
but—due to the size of the sample—statistically insignificant difference in outcome between judges
who admitted the evidence at issue and judges who excluded the evidence. See id. at 1296, 1302. It is
not clear whether this difference would attain significance with a larger sample. See id.
329. See 9B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 29, § 2501; Donald Olander, Note, Resolving
Inconsistencies in Federal Special Verdicts, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1089, 1089 (1985).
330. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(2).
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evidence: if a court takes the time to determine whether expert evidence is
scientifically reliable and decides that it is not, the court will probably give less
weight to that evidence than it otherwise would have. Studies have found that
people are better able to ignore evidence when “the credibility of the inadmissible
information sought to be ignored is destroyed or at least called into question.”331
The arguments for imposing rules—particularly the FRE—are admittedly
weaker here than in other contexts where scholars have advocated their application
outside trial. For example, in her argument for applying evidentiary rules to class
certification proceedings, Linda Mullenix observes that those proceedings have
become bloated with large quantities of inadmissible evidence, and she worries that
judges might be influenced by volume rather than quality.332 In preliminary
injunction proceedings, time constraints may limit the amount of evidence parties
can gather in time for a hearing. None of the judges I spoke with suggested they
were overwhelmed with evidence at preliminary injunction hearings.
B. Problems with Applying the Rules
The previous sections have critiqued the justifications for doing away with the
FRE at preliminary injunction proceedings and have discussed how applying those
Rules could be beneficial. But there are potentially serious problems with applying
the FRE at the preliminary injunction stage. Specifically, the FRE may lead to less
accurate findings in preliminary injunction proceedings than they do after discovery.
Also, this inaccuracy may disproportionately fall on plaintiffs, improperly
reallocating the risk of error.
As discussed above, courts have justified ditching the FRE by citing the need
to prevent irreparable harm quickly.333 How does that need justify abandonment of
the FRE? If litigants cannot discover all relevant evidence in the time before the
preliminary injunction hearing, applying the FRE may operate to exclude the
evidence that they do have, and it may deny the court a factual basis for imposing
(or declining to impose) a preliminary injunction. This increases the likelihood that
the court will fail to prevent (or cause) irreparable harm. In John Leubsdorf’s words,
it increases “the probable irreparable loss of rights caused by errors incident to
hasty decision.”334
But excluding evidence at trial also may deprive the court of the only evidence
the litigants have. Why is doing so more likely to cause the court to err at a
preliminary injunction hearing? Because time constraints mean even parties with
valid claims may be able to collect only “fragmentary information” before a
preliminary injunction hearing,335 the inability to produce high-quality, admissible

331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinski, supra note 327, at 1275–76.
Mullenix, supra note 153, at 624–25. I am skeptical that judges will succumb to this error.
See supra text accompanying notes 228–33.
Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 541.
Berman, supra note 214, at 34.
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evidence is less characteristic of a weak case at the preliminary injunction stage than
it is at trial. Parties with strong cases are likely to be able to obtain high-quality,
admissible evidence during discovery. Therefore, by excluding low-quality evidence
at trial, the FRE should rarely seriously prejudice strong cases; instead, they force
parties to produce the “best evidence reasonably available.”336 At the preliminary
injunction stage, however, many meritorious plaintiffs may not have admissible
evidence. This means that the alternative to inadmissible evidence will not be “better
evidence”; it will be “no evidence.” By excluding low-quality evidence at the
preliminary injunction stage, then, the court prejudices more strong cases than it
does by excluding low-quality evidence at trial. It inhibits accurate fact finding.
Importantly, this distinction holds only where the plaintiffs could obtain
admissible evidence if given the time but can obtain only inadmissible evidence due
to time limitations. In cases where the parties are able to obtain evidence for the
preliminary injunction hearing equivalent to what they would obtain for trial,
accuracy considerations provide no justification for admitting additional evidence
at the preliminary injunction stage. This is particularly likely if the harm evidence is
within the proponent’s possession or if the preliminary injunction hearing occurs
long after the motion is filed. The time from case initiation to the preliminary
injunction hearing varies dramatically, from days to years.337 Anticipating this
variation, Rule 65(a)(2) not only allows admissible evidence from the preliminary
injunction hearing to come in at trial but even allows a judge to consolidate the
hearing with the trial on the merits. Time constraints are not so much a hallmark of
a preliminary injunction motion as a distinct possibility. Only when time is short
and the evidence suffers for it is there a strong reason to abandon the FRE.
An additional problem with applying the FRE at the preliminary injunction
stage is that it may shift the risk of error disproportionately onto plaintiffs.
Allocating risk of error is a primary function of rules of evidence.338 In civil
litigation, we generally allocate the risk so as not to prefer one party over the

336. Nance, supra note 301, at 227.
337. See Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 203, at 595 tbl.3B (examining patent cases in the early
1990s and finding that preliminary injunction hearings occurred a little over six months after case
initiation, on average). Another set of authors analyzed every reported decision on a TRO or preliminary
injunction motion in the federal courts from 2003 to 2006. See KIRSTIN STOLL-DEBELL, NANCY
L. DEMPSEY & BRADFORD E. DEMPSEY, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS
AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS 189–91 (2009). Averages ranged from about one month to nearly
two years, with many districts averaging about six months. Id. I have not included districts that reported
only one decision during this period. The District of Nebraska reported only one decision, which
appears to have taken about a week, and the District of Wyoming reported only one decision, which
took about twenty-six months. Id. at 190–91, 194.
338. STEIN, supra note 323, at 133–40; see also Michael S. Pardo, The Political Morality of Evidence
Law, 5 INT’L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE [i], 4 (2007) (reviewing Stein’s book and noting that part of
the “moral” task of evidence law is to allocate the risk of error, calling this “orthodoxy in
evidence scholarship”).
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other: the plaintiff’s losses and defendant’s losses are equally bad.339 The burden of
proof on each element is essentially a tie-breaking rule.340
The imposition of exclusionary rules under time constraints could, however,
shift this risk. Plaintiffs, who carry the burden of production and persuasion, always
need to present evidence that they are likely to succeed and likely to suffer
irreparable harm absent an injunction. Evidence will not come solely from the
plaintiff’s side, of course: defendants introduce evidence both negating the
plaintiff’s case and demonstrating that an injunction will itself cause irreparable
harm. Still, among the cases in which a party challenges the admissibility of evidence,
they appear to be largely challenges by defendants to plaintiff evidence—in every
one of the major circuit cases discussed above, the challenge was to the plaintiff’s
evidence.341 If plaintiffs are the ones offering inadmissible evidence, applying the
FRE will shift the risk of error in preliminary injunction proceedings against
plaintiffs. This asymmetrical risk of error clashes with our idea of evenhandedness
in civil suits, and it is of particular concern when plaintiffs face the possibility of
irreparable harm. Reallocation of risk of error and increase in risk of error are the
two most serious problems with applying the FRE to preliminary injunction motions.
IV. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
At this point I have demonstrated both the shortcomings of several
justifications for abandoning the FRE and the problems with applying them. So,
where does that leave us? In this Part, I offer two proposals for how courts—and,
potentially, rule makers—should use the lessons from this Article. First, I offer a
proposal that is both more ambitious and more tentative: apply the FRE at
preliminary injunction proceedings but include an escape hatch for evidence that
implicates the specific dangers of applying the FRE before the parties have had a
full opportunity for discovery. But I recognize that is unlikely to happen: courts may
be uninterested in changing a practice that has not resulted in any outcry from
parties. In that event, I offer a second, firmer proposal: courts should recognize
that evidence submitted to show likelihood of success on the merits is
meta-evidence. They should weigh that evidence by determining how clearly it
demonstrates that the proponent will be able to produce admissible, credible
evidence at trial. This would not change what evidence is admissible, but it could
dramatically change how much probative value judges assign this evidence.

339. See STEIN, supra note 323, at 219.
340. Id. at 221–22.
341. See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016); Mullins
v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2010); Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700 (3d
Cir. 2004); Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Peters, 871 F.2d 1336 (7th Cir. 1989); Asseo v. Pan Am. Grain Co.,
805 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1986); Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1984). But see Transcript
of Court’s Ruling at 34–35, Warner v. Gross, No. 5:14-cv-00665-F, 2014 WL 7671680
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 23, 2014), ECF No. 179; Rice v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2 F. Supp. 3d 25, 31
(D. Mass. 2014).
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A. Proposal One: Apply the Rules, Add an Exception
To determine what evidentiary regime best suits the preliminary injunction
context, I start by reiterating the central goal of preliminary injunctions: to minimize
“the probable irreparable loss of rights caused by errors incident to hasty
decision.”342 Unsurprisingly,343 an evidentiary regime will minimize the probable
irreparable loss of rights if it facilitates accurate fact finding. First, a judge will tend
to minimize the “errors” through a more accurate determination of likelihood of
success on the merits. Second, the judge will be better able to determine the
irreparable harm to each party—the loss of rights if the court has indeed erred. In
addition, the evidentiary regime should not reallocate the risk of error between
parties to too great a degree—it should, as best as possible, put plaintiffs and
defendants at equal risk of error.344
So, what rules best facilitate truth seeking? The question has been debated for
centuries. Jeremy Bentham famously called for a regime of “free proof,” where
exclusionary rules are largely abolished in the name of truth seeking.345 This idea
has many fans today—a number of evidence scholars have called for the abolition
of the rule against hearsay or other exclusionary rules.346 Bentham’s project achieved
partial success—relevant evidence is presumed admissible, and one of
Bentham’s major targets was competency rules that excluded witnesses with an
interest in the case; today nearly all witnesses are deemed competent to testify.347
But on the whole, Bentham’s view is not encapsulated in the FRE, which are largely
a list of exclusionary rules. Some of these rules, such as those that protect
privileges,348 exclude evidence for reasons other than truth seeking.349 But those
rules are in the minority. In other words, the rule makers—the advisory committee

342. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 541.
343. See D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Reformed Standards for the Trial and Review
of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1281, 1283–84 (2004) (discussing the “Search for Truth”
or “Rationalist” model as the dominant account of the purpose of trial).
344. See STEIN, supra note 323, at 133–40, 219.
345. See 5 BENTHAM, supra note 236, at 615 (arguing for free proof but also noting that the
factfinder should be instructed on the untrustworthiness of certain types of evidence); WILLIAM
TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 27–28 (1985); see also Barzun, supra
note 286, at 1966–67. “Free proof” is not Bentham’s term, but it is now associated with his approach.
346. See, e.g., Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence Hearsay Rule, 72
B.U. L. REV. 893, 894 (1992) (“The degree of consensus among twentieth century evidence scholars
concerning the intellectual bankruptcy of hearsay doctrine is nothing short of remarkable.”); Mark
Spottswood, Signal vs. Noise: Some Comments on Professor Stein’s Theory of Evidential Efficiency, 66
ALA. L. REV. 471, 471 (2015) (“Evidence is an unusual field of legal study, in part because so many of
its devotees doubt, from time to time, that it should exist at all.”).
347. See FED. R. EVID. 402; FED. R. EVID. 601; Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence
Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 951 (2006); Todd E. Pettys,
The Immoral Application of Exclusionary Rules, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 463, 479.
348. See FED. R. EVID. 501; FED. R. EVID. 502.
349. 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 135, § 5:2.
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and Congress—made the judgment that exclusionary rules facilitate truth seeking.350
And the rule makers applied the FRE to bench trials as well as jury trials.
Without necessarily agreeing with that premise, I take it as an assumption
inherent in our law of evidence: in the normal trial context, including the
bench-trial context, the FRE facilitate truth seeking. Any departure from the FRE,
then, should be justified on the grounds that a new context disrupts the FRE’s
truth-seeking function, and the departure should do no more than remedy that
disruption. I have identified this disruption above: in the preliminary injunction
context, parties are sometimes unable to discover all reliable, relevant evidence
before the hearing, so excluding evidence inadmissible under the FRE may frustrate
the truth-seeking process by eliminating the only evidence available to parties with
meritorious claims.
But preliminary injunction cases vary dramatically,351 and applying the FRE
will not always harm accuracy at a preliminary injunction proceeding relative to trial.
If admissible evidence on point is within the proponent’s possession or easily
obtainable on short notice, or if the preliminary injunction hearing is held long after
the motion is filed, the justification for deviating from the FRE no longer applies.
In many cases, a party may be able to offer evidence that it will be irreparably
harmed if the court fails to issue an injunction (or does issue an injunction), so
applying the FRE will not prejudice that party. In addition, Rule 43 explicitly allows
the motion to be heard partly on affidavits. And as discussed above, much evidence
submitted on the likelihood-of-success prong will be admissible, because that
evidence need only point to admissible evidence that the party will produce at trial.
The harm of applying the FRE arises with regard to only some pieces of evidence in
some cases. If the rules generally foster accurate fact finding, any deviation from
those rules should be tailored to only those pieces of evidence where the deviation
is justified.
The most straightforward way to target this problem is with an escape
hatch: an exception to the FRE that allows a court to consider any piece of evidence,
despite its inadmissibility under the FRE, if it implicates the problems unique to
offering evidence in the preliminary injunction context. The exception should allow
only relevant, helpful evidence, of course. And the exception should not allow courts
to consider evidence that undermines the non-truth-seeking purposes of the FRE,
such as incentivizing desirable primary conduct.
With those principles in mind, I propose three criteria for the Preliminary
Injunction Exception: otherwise inadmissible evidence352 may be considered on a
preliminary injunction motion if the proponent demonstrates that (1) the time
350. FED. R. EVID. 102 (noting that one purpose of the FRE is “ascertaining the truth”); Seigel,
supra note 346, at 905 (noting that the standard defense of the rule against hearsay is that “[m]inimizing
the hearsay risks maximizes the accuracy of the fact-finding process”).
351. See supra notes 30–37 and accompanying text.
352. Evidence that may be considered under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(c) would
remain admissible under this rule.
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constraints of the preliminary injunction make obtaining admissible evidence on the
same point impracticable; (2) the evidence has sufficient guarantees of
trustworthiness, considering the time constraints; and (3) admission will not unduly
prejudice the objecting party.
Under this exception, a number of Federal Rules of Evidence would still apply.
The privilege rules would be unaffected by the exception, per Rule 1101(c).353 And
courts should enforce the categorical exclusions—Rule 408, regulating the
admissibility of settlement offers, for example—under the directives of FRE 102
and FRCP 1, which require courts to construe and administer the FRE and FRCP
“fairly”354 and “to secure the just . . . determination” of the proceeding.355
Admitting evidence that would disincentivize plea bargaining or disincentivize open
conversation between attorneys and their clients would thwart important purposes
of the FRE.356
Rule 702 and Daubert would still apply, to some degree, under prong two:
expert testimony that is not the product of reliable principles and methods and
expert testimony where the principles and methods have been unreliably applied are
insufficiently trustworthy. However, a court might relax its usual Daubert standards
for purposes of a preliminary injunction motion. For example, convention holds
that an effect measured in an experiment is “statistically significant” if the “p-value”
is less than 0.05.357 In other words, if a researcher wants to investigate whether there
is a relationship between two variables—say, whether a certain chemical causes fish
to die—she would gather data, analyze the relationship between the variables in her
data set, and ask, “If there was no real relationship here—if this chemical did not in
fact correlate with fish death—would I have less than a 5% chance of observing a
relationship at least this strong in my data?”358 If the answer is “yes,” she may reject
the hypothesis that there is no relationship; in other words, she has a significant
result.359 Null-hypothesis significance testing of this sort has been roundly and

353. See FED. R. EVID. 1101(c) (“The rules on privilege apply to all stages of a case
or proceeding.”).
354. FED. R. EVID. 102.
355. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
356. The exception could contain a fourth prong, explicitly allowing the court to consider the
evidence only if consideration of the evidence will serve, not thwart, the purposes of the Federal Rules
of Evidence and the interests of justice. Rule 807, the residual exception to the hearsay rule, used to
contain a similar requirement. See FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(4) (amended 2019) (“[A]dmitting [the hearsay
statement] will best serve the purposes of these rules and the interests of justice.”). The amendments
to the Rule eliminated this prong as “superfluous” in light of Rules 102 and 401. See FED. R. EVID. 807
advisory committee’s note to 2019 amendment. I agree and decline to include an explicit “interests of
justice” requirement in the proposed Rule.
357. See Saul McLeod, What a P-Value Tells You About Statistical Significance, SIMPLY
PSYCHOL. (May 20, 2019), https://www.simplypsychology.org/p-value.html [ https://perma.cc/
2DUR-22YG ].
358. See Jacob Cohen, The Earth Is Round (p < .05), 49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 997,
997–98 (1994).
359. “The overwhelming majority of courts have accepted as dogma a rule that any P-value
greater than either .05 or less than two standard deviations is not sufficient to disprove a null hypothesis
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persuasively criticized for decades.360 Nevertheless, the method and convention
persist. Even if a court would otherwise require evidence to meet this p < 0.05
threshold, as courts occasionally do,361 the court may soften this requirement at the
preliminary injunction hearing. If a party’s expert has not had time to collect enough
data to yield a significant result, the court, considering the facts in front of it, may
decide that p < 0.10 is sufficient for the purposes of the preliminary injunction
stage. But the judge would still need to analyze reliability under the Daubert standard
to see how reliable she believed it to be.
Other rules, including the rule against hearsay and the “best evidence” rule,
which requires a party to produce an original document, recording, or photograph
to prove its contents,362 are more likely to bend. Parties may not always be able to
track down the original evidentiary source before a preliminary injunction hearing;
hearsay and summaries of document content may, depending on the circumstances,
be sufficiently reliable; and in certain cases, consideration of this evidence will not
prejudice the other party.
A new exception to the FRE may sound like a cop-out: too easy to conjure up
and too difficult to apply. But in this case, the exception has several advantages and
few disadvantages. As for advantages, it maintains many of the benefits of applying
rules, generally.363 If a party objected to the evidence, the court would first consider
whether it is admissible under the FRE—forcing it to articulate and appreciate a
theory of relevance. The court would then need to consider whether the evidence
is trustworthy and unduly prejudicial, forcing it to consider any dangers inherent in
the evidence. Further, while admissibility will not be as predictable as it would be
without the exception, it is far more predictable than without any rules. Parties will
know that as a general matter, they will have to submit admissible evidence, and
they will know what they have to show if they can obtain only inadmissible evidence

of random chance.” Michael I. Meyerson & William Meyerson, Significant Statistics: The Unwitting
Policy Making of Mathematically Ignorant Judges, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 771, 821 (2010) (criticizing courts’
reliance on p-values).
360. See Daniel J. Benjamin et al., Redefine Statistical Significance, 2 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 6
(2018); Cohen, supra note 358, at 997–98; William W. Rozeboom, The Fallacy of the Null-Hypothesis
Significance Test, 57 PSYCHOL. BULL. 416 (1960); Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Legal
Sufficiency of Statistical Evidence (George Mason Legal Studies Research, Paper No. LS 18-29, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3238793 [ https://perma.cc/X6EX-F2BJ ] (concluding that evidence
should be legally sufficient when p < 0.5, not 0.05); Dan Kahan, The Earth Is (Still) Round, Even at P
< 0.005, CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT: BLOG (Aug. 23, 2017, 7:40 AM), http://
www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2017/8/23/the-earth-is-still-round-even-at-p-0005.html [ https://
perma.cc/Z4ST-2VUV ].
361. See DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN & JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, THE NEW
WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 12.8.4 (2d ed. 2011) (noting that in
some contexts, “courts have treated statistical significance as an important consideration affecting the
admissibility of expert testimony under Daubert”); see also Bruce R. Parker, Effective Strategies for Closing
the Door on Junk Science Experts, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 338, 347 (1998) (advising attorneys to “educate”
the court about the p < 0.05 standard at Daubert hearings).
362. See FED. R. EVID. 1002.
363. See supra Section III.A.
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in time for the hearing. Further, it discourages parties from purposefully introducing
more favorable, inadmissible evidence, as they know they will have to justify
its consideration.364
While three prongs may sound time consuming, two of them pose questions
familiar to a judge: How trustworthy is the evidence?365 Will it unduly prejudice the
other party?366 Those questions are often decided fairly quickly. As for the first
prong, the proponent or their attorney could testify to any efforts made to secure
admissible evidence and why those efforts failed, or they could testify to what
difficult or time-consuming tasks would be necessary to obtain admissible evidence.
And the court could limit this presentation, so significant hearing time would not
be spent arguing about admissibility.
The exception may seem unnecessary, as the FRE already contain a residual
exception to the rule against hearsay, Rule 807. And a broad reading of that Rule
could allow much of the evidence allowed by the Preliminary Injunction Exception.
In particular, Rule 807 states that the hearsay must be “more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain
through reasonable efforts.”367 The phrase “reasonable efforts” could be read in
context to mean “reasonable efforts under the time constraints attendant to a
preliminary injunction motion.” And while the old version of Rule 807 required the
hearsay statement to have “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness,”368 meaning the hearsay must be as trustworthy as hearsay
permitted by the enumerated exceptions,369 the newly-amended Rule 807 requires
only “sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness,”370 similar to the proposed
exception. The proposed exception, then, does not deviate much from existing law.
However, the Preliminary Injunction Exception would clarify that time constraints,
specifically, justify admitting otherwise inadmissible evidence, and it would address
admissibility despite exclusionary rules other than the rule against hearsay. It is not
simply redundant with Rule 807.
There are two ways the FRE and this exception could be implemented. First,
the exception could be implemented by an amendment to either the FRCP or the
FRE. The two most logical locations for the rule are as an addition to the
Preliminary Injunctions Rule, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, or as an
amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 1101(b), setting out the applicability of the
FRE. In either location, the rule would prescribe that the FRE apply to preliminary
364. See Nance, supra note 301.
365. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(1); FED. R. EVID. 803(6)(E), (7)(C), (8)(B); FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(3).
366. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 15(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(3); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(1). These
rules are not specifically evidentiary, but they require the court to evaluate the prejudice of a change in
litigation circumstances.
367. FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(2).
368. FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(1) (amended Dec. 1, 2019).
369. See 5 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 135, § 8:141.
370. FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(1).
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injunction motions, with an exception. Although, as I have argued, the FRE should,
by its own terms, apply to preliminary injunction hearings, courts would not be so
quick to ignore a rule that explicitly makes the FRE applicable.
Second, courts could simply begin announcing that they will apply the FRE at
the preliminary injunction stage unless the evidence meets the criteria in the
exception. In circuits where the court of appeals has explicitly said they do not apply,
that court can reverse course. In circuits that have not discussed the issue, district
courts can just begin to apply the FRE; ideally, they would include this policy in the
local rules or post it in their chambers rules to put the parties on notice. Although
the exception would contravene the text of the Federal Rules—which apply the
FRE in full—as courts have not previously been applying the FRE, it is unlikely that
they would feel they were exceeding their authority by beginning to apply the rules
with one exception.
Either way, applying the FRE plus an escape hatch at the preliminary
injunction phase would give us the best of both worlds: the predictability and
reason-giving forced by rules and the flexibility necessary to facilitate truth seeking.
I said this proposal was both ambitious and tentative. The ambition is
clear: what I suggest goes against what every court has prescribed. The tentativeness
is related. Although there are a number of deficiencies with the current haphazard
system, there has been no great outcry from litigants or judges. Although I have not
found any relevant empirical work, it may be that the existing system works
reasonably well. In fact, many scholars would argue that this discretionary regime is
far preferable to the rules-bound regime we have in bench trials.371 A judge who
receives all available evidence and chooses whether to consider it and how heavily
to weigh it may be in a better position to determine truth than a judge who considers
only information admissible under the FRE. In that case, the better remedy would
not be to level up but rather to level down: Stop applying the FRE to bench trials.
Or any trials. Let Bentham’s free proof reign supreme. I don’t argue against that
point because I think it’s wrong—it may well be right. But I take it as a given that
we are not about to eliminate the FRE, because we think that, on the whole, they
are helpful. It is only because I accept that premise that I recommend expanding
the FRE’s purview instead of contracting it.
B. Proposal Two: Weigh Meta-Evidence Appropriately
But perhaps that ship has also sailed. Perhaps everyone is sufficiently happy
with the status quo, and courts will continue to accept whatever evidence they deem
sufficiently reliable and give it whatever weight they deem appropriate. In that case,
371. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Rules of Evidence for Nonjury Cases, 50
A.B.A. J. 723 (1964); Peter L. Murray & John C. Sheldon, Should the Rules of Evidence Be Modified for
Civil Non-Jury Trials?, 17 ME. B.J. 30 (2002); Schauer, supra note 316, at 166 n.4 (citing James
H. Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule—A Benthamic View of Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules
of Evidence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 932, 937 (1962)); John Sheldon & Peter Murray, Rethinking the Rules of
Evidentiary Admissibility in Non-Jury Trials, 86 JUDICATURE 227, 231 (2003).
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I have a second proposal—and this one I offer without hesitation: understand that
evidence of likelihood of success on the merits is meta-evidence and weigh
it accordingly.
Whether or not the evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearing
is admissible, in order for a party to succeed at trial, that party will have to offer
admissible evidence. Therefore, in order to demonstrate likelihood of success on
the merits, the party has to present evidence to the court tending to prove that it
will be able to offer admissible evidence at trial.372 Evidence introduced to prove
likelihood of success on the merits is probative only to the extent that it tends to
prove the proponent will offer admissible evidence when it counts.
If the evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearing is itself
admissible, this evidence is likely dispositive of what will be presented at trial. Unless
there is some reason to believe the same evidence will not be available at trial, the
court can simply look at how far the evidence goes toward proving the proponent’s
case on the merits.
If, on the other hand, the evidence presented at the preliminary injunction
hearing would not be admissible at trial, the court must determine, from that
evidence, how likely it is that the proponent will be able to present admissible
evidence at trial. The court’s task is not to determine how well the inadmissible
evidence proves the merits. It is only to determine likelihood of success. For example,
take a copyright case, where the plaintiff must prove that the defendant copied the
plaintiff’s original work.373 The plaintiff testifies at the preliminary injunction
hearing: “The defendant and I spoke before the hearing and tried to resolve the
case. During that conversation, he admitted to me that he copied my work.” A
reasonable factfinder might find this to be strong evidence of copying. However,
this is not very probative of whether the plaintiff is likely to succeed at trial: the
defendant’s statement made during settlement negotiations would be inadmissible
at trial to prove the validity of the claim under FRE 408(a)(2),374 and a judge might
be skeptical that the defendant would repeat the statement on the witness stand.
This evidence, then, while strong evidence of the merits, is fairly weak evidence of
likelihood of success on the merits.375 The court should weigh it accordingly.
To be clear, courts should weigh meta-evidence this way whether or not they are
applying the FRE at the preliminary injunction hearing. But there is one difference

372. Cf. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 555 (“Although the court cannot know at the preliminary
hearing what evidence the parties will present at trial, it can estimate the probability of different findings
of fact by using affidavits, representations of counsel, inferences from the failure to produce accessible
evidence, and the judge’s own notions about the plausibility of the parties’ contentions.”).
373. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
374. Most courts would probably exclude this statement from the preliminary injunction
hearing. See supra notes 106–110 and accompanying text. But a court that did not follow the FRE at all
would permit it.
375. The evidence is helpful meta-evidence to the extent it suggests the defendant would testify
to copying at trial, or it suggests the defendant has admitted the copying to others, and those witnesses
could testify.
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between a court weighing meta-evidence under the FRE and one weighing
meta-evidence without those limitations. If a court has abandoned the FRE, it may
make inferences prohibited by those rules in determining likelihood of success. In
the hypothetical copyright case above, a court applying the FRE could not infer from
the plaintiff’s testimony that the defendant copied the plaintiff’s work. The judge
may not consider statements made during settlement negotiations as evidence
proving the validity of the claim. However, if a court is not applying the FRE, it may
infer that the defendant actually made this statement during settlement negotiations
and, therefore, that he actually copied the plaintiff’s work. That inference may be
helpful to the judge, because the judge may run through the following chain
of reasoning:
This testimony suggests the defendant said he copied the plaintiff’s work;
that, in turn, suggests he did, in fact, copy the plaintiff’s work; and that, in
turn, suggests that even if this evidence is inadmissible, there is likely to be
other evidence of copying introduced at trial. If he in fact copied, the
plaintiff is likely to find evidence of copying.
Through this reasoning, the plaintiff’s testimony is probative of likelihood of
success. It is not nearly as probative as it would be if it pointed directly to admissible
evidence. But it is not irrelevant.
There is a potential injustice lurking here: If the point of a preliminary
injunction is to prevent irreparable harm, why are we not concerned with the merits
themselves? Why are we concerned only with likelihood of success later on? Is it not
more just for a plaintiff to get the preliminary injunction he needs and (in a sense)
deserves, even if he will eventually lose at trial? First, independent of whether it is a
good standard or a bad standard, “likelihood of success on the merits” is the
standard we have.376 The Supreme Court has directed that “likely to succeed” is one
of the four preliminary injunction factors, so this is the inquiry courts must
undertake. Evidence that does not tend to show whether the plaintiff can succeed
at trial is irrelevant to the inquiry.
Second, the standard is sensible given the purpose of a preliminary injunction.
As Leubsdorf discusses, the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to minimize the
loss of “rights” caused by “errors” that stem from the short timeline.377 A
preliminary injunction decision is “erroneous” only “in the sense that it may be
different from the decision that ultimately will be reached.”378 In other words, the
parties’ “rights” are “legal rights”379 determined by the trial on the merits. If the
preliminary injunction decision deviates from the decision on the merits, one party
has suffered a loss of “rights,” due to the preliminary injunction decision. If a court

376. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (“A plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits . . . .”).
377. Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 541.
378. Id.
379. See id. (“Not even all irreparable harm, but only irreparable harm to legal rights,
should count.”).
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were to make its preliminary injunction decision not based on likelihood of success
at trial, that court would fail to minimize the probable loss of rights.
A further difficulty arises when evidence relates to both likelihood of success
on the merits and irreparable harm. Some causes of action that might form the basis
of a preliminary injunction motion, such as defamation or false advertising, have
“harm” as an element of the claim itself.380 To show likelihood of success on the
merits, then, the plaintiff must demonstrate that it will be able to show harm at trial.
That inquiry, however, is distinct from the showing of irreparable harm at the
preliminary injunction phase: at the first stage, the plaintiff must show that absent
a preliminary injunction, it will suffer harm that cannot be remedied at trial.381 But
the two inquiries will likely overlap.382 The plaintiff may present evidence that the
defendant’s actions are likely to cause harm, and this evidence can relate to both the
irreparable-harm prong and the likelihood-of-success prong. But the court should
approach the evidence differently, depending on which prong it is analyzing. For
the irreparable-harm inquiry, the evidence is probative to the extent it tends to show
likelihood of harm; for the likelihood-of-success inquiry, the evidence is probative
to the extent it tends to show that the plaintiff will be able to present evidence of
harm at trial. Therefore, if a court does not follow the FRE at the preliminary
injunction hearing, the plaintiff may present inadmissible evidence of irreparable
harm. That evidence could—in theory—be very probative on the irreparable-harm
prong and far less probative on the likelihood-of-success prong, if it does not
suggest admissible evidence to come. The court should consider the probative value
of the evidence on each inquiry separately.
We can now return to the Giuliani statement. The district court appeared to
take this statement as direct evidence of President Trump’s animus against
Muslims.383 But the statement—that President Trump told him to create a legal
version of the Muslim ban—is probative only on the likelihood-of-success-on-the-merits
inquiry, and it is probative only to the extent that it points to admissible evidence.

380.
See Graboff v. Colleran Firm, 744 F.3d 128, 136 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that a statement is
defamatory under Pennsylvania law only if it tends to harm another’s reputation); Clark v. Time Inc.,
242 F. Supp. 3d 1194, 1215 (D. Kan. 2017) (noting that a plaintiff asserting a defamation claim under
Kansas law must establish “injury to plaintiff’s reputation”); N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide,
Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1224 (11th Cir. 2008) (listing injury or likelihood of injury as one element of a false
advertising claim a plaintiff must show to establish likelihood of success on the merits). Courts
frequently say injunctions are typically inappropriate in defamation cases. See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative
Non-Violence v. Pierce, 814 F.2d 663, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1987). These cases often focus on prior restraints;
injunctions requiring a party to take down specific material may be less troubling.
381. See Leubsdorf, supra note 27, at 541.
382. Cf. Vonderheide v. Harrisburg Area Cmty. Coll., No. 19-3096, 2019 WL 5423089, at *6,
*10 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2019) (addressing harm to reputation in both likelihood of success analysis and
irreparable harm analysis); Muhaisen v. Does 1 Through 100, No. 17-cv-01575-PAB-KLM, 2017 WL
6945043, at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 10, 2017) (considering harm to reputation and business when analyzing
both likelihood of success and irreparable harm); Riverdale Mills Corp. v. Cavatorta N. Am., Inc., 146
F. Supp. 3d 356, 363 (D. Mass. 2015) (referring to danger of damage to reputation in both likelihood
of success analysis and irreparable harm analysis noting they “dovetail[]”).
383. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 558 (D. Md. 2017).
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Even under the FRE, the evidence is admissible on this point as non-hearsay, but
only because the court should not use it as evidence of animus. Rather, it is evidence
that this potential witness could testify at trial about the origins of the ban, and that
this evidence would tend to support the plaintiffs’ claim. If the FRE don’t apply,
the interview might tend to prove animus, but that is helpful only to the extent that
it suggests additional admissible evidence of animus might emerge before trial.
Either way, the evidence is admissible, but it is less probative than some courts
have suggested.
CONCLUSION
Classically, the FRE operate to keep prejudicial or unreliable evidence from a
jury, so the jury can render an accurate final verdict at a trial that takes place after
months or years of discovery. The preliminary injunction hearing is a different sort
of proceeding: it takes place before a judge, often after little time to discover
evidence, and it does not involve a final decision on the merits. Courts have thrown
off the yoke of the FRE under these circumstances. Yet the reasons for deviating
from the usual practice are surprisingly thin: the FRE apply to bench trials as well
as jury trials; they are highly consequential, even if they do not involve a final
decision on the merits; and one of the major inquiries at this stage—likelihood of
success on the merits—allows courts to consider evidence that would not be
admissible on the merits. A narrow, discretionary exception can retain the benefits
of the rules while accounting for the situations where the haste of a preliminary
injunction motion calls for flexibility.
But even if the old system remains in place, and courts continue to disregard
the rules, the FRE cast a shadow over the preliminary injunction motion: The court
must determine likelihood of success on the merits, and parties will succeed at trial
only if they are able to present admissible evidence. The FRE, then, still have a
function in determining the evidentiary weight of meta-evidence. Even at a
preliminary injunction hearing, the Federal Rules of Evidence are inescapable.

First to Printer_Wittlin.docx (Do Not Delete)

1394

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

6/5/20 9:09 PM

[Vol. 10:1331

